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Union of the West – Global NATO – League of Democracies

Which way for U.S. Foreign Policy?

A discussion of policy options, in colloquia with Edouard Balladur at the Council on Foreign Relations and Johns Hopkins SAIS in Washington, D.C. September 2008

With articles and comments by:

Daniel Hamilton, Director, Center for Transatlantic Relations, SAIS
Stanley Sloan, Rohatyn Center, Middlebury College
Edouard Balladur, Former Prime Minister of France
and others

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Freedom & Union

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Prefatory Note

For a Union of the West[1] is the title of the latest book of former French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur. It goes far toward explaining the new Atlanticism of France; the current French government is headed by a long-time Balladur protégé, Nicolas Sarkozy. It has also made a stir in America.

Balladur visited Washington in September on the invitation of the Streit Council for a Union of Democracies. He put his proposal to U.S. Government officials and foreign policy experts, meeting with Secretary of State Rice, Senators Lugar and Warner, and other figures from both executive and legislative branches.

Balladur also gave an address at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, attended by an overflow crowd of 250 at the Rome Auditorium of SAIS, and led a Roundtable at the Council on Foreign Relations. Material from these events are in the pages below.

Policy World
February 2009

[1] Edouard Balladur, Pour une Union occidentale entre l'Europe et les Etats-Unis (Paris, Fayard, 2007). The U.S. edition is to be published by Hoover Institution Press later this year.

The Balladur proposals on the financial crisis

Balladur's visit to Washington coincided with the financial crisis. As a former Economics Minister, who together with James Baker had initiated the Plaza-Louvre accords, his overall proposal has two economic points of particular interest to policy-makers and policy analysts at this time:

A. Coordination of financial regulation between the U.S. and Europe, with a view to avoiding regulatory gaps and financial crises such as the current one that spread from one side of the Atlantic to the other.

B. Renewal of the currency coordination that Baker and Balladur had set up in the Plaza and Louvre G-5 accords in the 1980s, to avoid dollar-euro fluctuations of the size seen in recent years.

Policy analysis is needed on these subjects:

How regulatory coordination of the two sides could be set up with a view to preventing gaps in financial regulation.

Whether regulatory coordination could at the same time achieve the other objectives of favoring best practices, and harmonizing regulations to reduce the burdens and obstructions of separate regulatory regimes.

The extent of the costs of dollar-euro fluctuations to export industries and to job security.

The methods of currency coordination and macroeconomic harmonization most suited for the trans-Atlantic level today, learning from the experiences of the G-5 and the European Monetary System.

Summary View of Issues Raised in the Book and in the Discussions with Balladur

1. The scale and implications of Western decline vis-à-vis emerging economies. Balladur's book differs with several widely discussed recent works on Western decline. He views the decline as real but less drastic in objective terms than usually said: the West still holds over 55% of global GDP. However, he sees the decline as becoming dangerously sharp on the subjective level, and as likely to go farther objectively in coming decades. This discussion of a multiplicity of facets of decline has led to divergent views on the timeframe it implies for Union (as seen in the Modelski article in the previous issue of *Freedom & Union* and the Straus article in this issue). It has also led to praise for his book as more subtle and accurate than other recent writings on decline; more sound in its categories, since he counts "the West" as an entity whose weight is just as important as that of the EU and U.S. considered separately, and since he recognizes the U.S. and EU have a potential for building their future together not just for building it against each other; and more intellectually honest, in the sense that his prescription, Union, would be likely to serve its stated purpose of ameliorating Western decline in an evolutionary way, whereas prescriptions from some other writers, particularly those aimed against the Western alliance system which is portrayed as an economic drain on America, would be likely to induce the sharp decline they predict.

2. The "open door" of the West. Three views are expressed in the pages below on how open should be the door of the West for letting in more members. Balladur is the most cautious. He holds that the EU is already overextended, he opposes a League of all Democracies, and thinks that we should look rather at the advanced industrial democracies; but adds that one should never close the door permanently to others: he would "start with the obvious states, and then gradually over the years we will see what problems arise and how we want to solve them." Hamilton is the most inclusive; he argues that the institutional aquis of NATO includes an "open door" for inclusion of other countries that meet the standards. Alessandri takes an intermediate view. He argues that the expression of the "open door" in the Atlanticist tradition is even more emphatic theoretically than in Hamilton's statement, yet also more cautious in practice: the Atlantic Union is meant to be a nucleus for an eventual world federation, attracting others to reform in order to join it; but as long as the societies of the world are on deeply different levels of development, an Atlantic Union must serve in the meantime as a core power of the world order and a supplement to the outer circle of global institutions, so as to be able to guide international development, gradually and soberly, toward ultimate convergence on the modern democratic form of society.

3. Europeanism and Atlanticism: allies or enemies? None of the articles or comments below is against Balladur's proposal for a U.S.-EU Council. Nevertheless some of the questions express disquiet about whether it pushes its Europeanism in a manner that could be at the expense of Atlanticism. Such concerns deserve a forceful expression, so there is an adequate balance and readers can see how much could be at stake in some of the objections or concerns that are raised. We do not run such a forceful expression in these pages; in its absence, we will summarize in this paragraph the arguments made by John O'Sullivan against similar proposals. O'Sullivan is an Atlanticist and a Thatcherist; in the 1990s he founded the New Atlantic Initiative, an important post-Cold War

Atlanticist NGO. He holds that the EU tends to undermine Atlantic unity, and that the U.S. should avoid giving a greater role to the EU collectively in America's dialogue with European countries. He would oppose a U.S.-EU Council, or any inclusion of the EU in the NATO Council. The existing multilateral Councils of NATO and OECD, he argues, get real work done, they have a culture of moving toward consensus, they accept the realities of relative power relations and leadership roles among their member countries, and they are fairly efficient about reaching a common decision on major issues. US-EU relations are necessarily more limited and less useful: the EU is obsessed with establishing an identity independent of the United States and there is no habit of reaching agreement. And unions of two parties work poorly, there is no possible leadership role, no possible weighted voting arrangement, only either agreement or disagreement. The U.S.-EU relation should not be given a big new status, lest it compete politically and psychologically against the more useful NATO and OECD relations. If the EU were injected into the NATO Council, it would add no military power but only obstruct agreement. If the EU becomes able to command its members to follow a common policy in NATO, it will completely obstruct NATO. We will have thrown away a fairly strong, imperfect, but working trans-Atlantic Union, and gotten just a consultative US-EU talk-shop in its place.

Balladur, to be sure, has ample respect for the existing power of the West. He does not want to undermine its effectiveness. He advocates inserting the EU into NATO decision-making only *after* the EU has sufficient military and foreign policy capacity to justify it.

Nevertheless, he does not wish to build his Union on NATO, but on a Council of the U.S. and EU meeting as equals in a bilateral format. It is to this structure, even if it proved feeble, that he would give the powerful names, "Union" and "the West". Could it serve to push to the side the existing Atlantic institutions, with their weaker names and identities if stronger practical work? Perhaps O'Sullivan points to a genuine risk here.

How to move forward with Balladur while avoiding such a risk was an unspoken concern behind much of the discussion with him in Washington. Several people said the proposed Union should include also the NATO and OECD members that are not in the EU. Balladur agreed that a way should be found to do this, and added that the Union should include NATO per se, but without offering a formula for this yet; he emphasized that his proposal was not carved in granite and that this problems could be worked out through further discussion.

4. The "acquis Atlantique" (the cumulative integration achievements of the Atlantic institutions). Hamilton defined the acquis as beginning with the NATO treaty of 1949 and holds that a Union of the West should be based on it. Balladur used the same assumption to draw the opposite conclusion: he rejected the use of the Atlantic Alliance as a basis for a Union of the West, on the ground that it is too much tainted by its historical origin as a Cold War entity. Two articles on "Global NATO" below trace the acquis back much farther than Hamilton: to two generations of Atlantic alliances prior to 1945; to the intentions of NATO's founding generation, whose ideas were mostly developed during the World Wars and interwar years not the Cold War; and to a tradition of Atlanticist thinking going back to the late 1800s with a worldview on global not just European stabilization and progress. By implication they are saying that the existing Atlantic institutions provide a more solid basis for Union than a new U.S.-EU Council would, and if the existing institutions are incorporated into a Union together with a U.S.-EU Council, it would have to be done without subordinating them to that Council.

Roundtable with Edouard Balladur at the Council on Foreign Relations

September 10, 2008

The former Prime Minister presented his proposal for a "Union of the West", beginning with upgrading the U.S.-EU Summit into a Council meeting four times a year, to consult on all foreign policy issues with a view to voluntary coordination on them when agreement is found. In the economic field, he suggested developing a single free transatlantic market, going beyond the program of the Transatlantic Economic Council recently set up by the U.S. and EU to harmonize regulations, by adding currency coordination and a customs union. A discussion followed, focusing on the merits and means of upgrading the U.S.-EU relationship.

Who to include in "the West"? Several people asked how Balladur defines the West. How does it differ from the OECD world; would he see it expanding ultimately to include other countries? How can it be done without the Japanese, the Australians, the Canadians, especially when the rising power of China is specified as a motive for the union? One questioner stated outright that you cannot form such a Union and keep out the Japanese and the other advanced democracies. Balladur answered that in his proposal the West is defined as the European Union and the United States; while this left a problem of what do with those who would be left outside, particularly Canada, also Australia and Japan, he thought it was a problem that could be solved. Also, he said, the U.S. is together with these countries in other institutions and would retain these arrangements; the existence of the Union would not mean abandoning our other relationships.

The word "Union". There were many questions about the use of the word 'Union'. Several said it was not needed; the U.S.-EU Council he proposed was only for consultations; calling it a "Union" could make it harder to reach the goal, by raising nationalistic fears, without adding anything; and nationalistic tendencies are strong at this time. Alternatively, it was said "Union" is a good word, raising hopes as well as fears, and fits his long-term goals not the Council, which could more accurately be called something simple like Trans-Atlantic Council. Finally, one person said he should not retreat at all, Union was timely in view of the financial crisis, the costs industry is paying for currency fluctuations, and the unique moment of almost no anti-American governments in Europe. Balladur answered that there is no strict legal definition of a union, but there is no problem using a different word if Union is not a word people like. He described nationalistic reaction as a natural but an outdated impulse that people need to learn to overcome, as no country today can solve the main international problems facing it by acting alone. He recalled that it would have been tempting for France, after 1945, to stick to a nationalistic reaction against Germany, but instead it decided to reconcile with Germany and build a European Union, which has made all European countries stronger.

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Colloquium

Johns Hopkins
School of Advanced International Studies
September 11, 2008

For a Union of the West

Edouard Balladur*

These remarks are based on the author's September 11 address at Johns Hopkins SAIS. After he spoke, there was a panel with comments, and questions and answers from the audience; these appear below following the speech.

Today is the anniversary of a tragedy suffered by the United States of America; a tragedy that we also experienced, as French people and as Europeans. And on this very sad anniversary, I would like to express anew here, and renew, the sense of solidarity between our two peoples.

The reason I wrote my book a few months ago was to address the enhancement of the relationship between Europe and the United States in the new conditions of the world. These relations are sometimes good, sometimes not so good. And sometimes they are simply not enough.

There is no need to enumerate all the issues we are dealing with today. You know them as well as I do—terrorism, financial instability, erratic exchange rates, the future of a number of counties around the world. These are issues that we need to deal with whether we are European or American. To a great extent they are shared issues; they are common problems for which we need to come up with a common response.

Why are we able to think in terms of a common approach? First of all, because we share a number of beliefs, not least our love of democracy and of freedom. There is also a series of military and economic interests that we share. In fact we already work together on many things.

Indeed, over the course of my discussions the last few days here in Washington, one thing I was often told is: we already have many different bodies where we can have talks between Europeans and Americans, so what is the point of creating a new body? There is the Atlantic Alliance, there is the G8, there is the UN, there are meetings between the President of the United States and the President of the European Union.

However, this is not enough. We will only be able to address and solve the issues we face jointly if we become more united than we are at present.

* Edouard Balladur was Prime Minister of France from 1993 to 1995. Earlier he was Minister of Economy and introduced liberalizing economic reforms. Throughout his political career, he has been a member of the Gaullist party, Rally for the Republic; as a leader within the Gaullist movement, he is credited with having drawn the mainstream of French Gaullists back into a pro-European Union stance and into abandoning anti-American attitudes. The current President of France, Nicolas Sarkozy, rose within Balladur's wing of the Gaullist movement and, in Balladur's government, served as his spokesman and his Budget Minister. From 2002-2007 Balladur presided over the National Assembly's foreign affairs committee; at present he heads the Commission on Constitutional Reforms.

*

We—the EU plus U.S.—represent approximately 800 million people. In twenty years' time, global population will have jumped from about 6 billion to perhaps 9 billion.

We still—and I insist on the word, still—account for over half of the world's GDP. We represent a little more than 55 percent; twenty years ago we represented about 70 percent; thirty years in the future we might represent only about 30 percent of global GDP. It is a relative weakening, if you will, compared to the rest of the world.

I was interested to read in a US newspaper that what was being prepared for the next president was a forecast of what the world might be like in the future. It made the same assessment that there was going to be a relative weakening of the countries that border the Atlantic Ocean. It is as if the world were slipping away from the West.

For centuries the West dominated the world; today it is facing competition, and is not organizing itself to deal with this situation. Its material strength is still unparalleled, but its moral strength and self-confidence are continuously weakening. History is beginning to be made without the West; perhaps one day it will be made against it. To avoid this, we need to strengthen our ties and join together for common action in the world.

What do we need to do for this purpose? It may help to set targets or objectives; then we can consider the means to achieve them.

As a first objective, we need to enhance our trade relations and eventually create a great Atlantic Market. Already, today the US invests in Europe a lot more than it invests in any other region around the world and Europe invests a lot more in the US than in any other region. Some studies indicate that on the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean we have twenty million people whose jobs are derived from exports to the other side of the Ocean. We are becoming an economic grouping; we need to overcome the various barriers that stand in the way of our grouping.

A second objective is to harmonize, as far as possible, our banking and financial market regulations. We are seeing at this very moment that when there is a gap in legislation on financial activities, be it in Europe or the United States, it has led to serious instability and could even trigger a lasting crisis. And we are seeing that when there is a crisis on one side of the ocean, it spreads to the other side. Therefore, we need better harmonization of our various forms of legislation.

A third objective is to remedy the disorder in the monetary sphere. There is a huge fluctuation in the exchange rate, which is supposed to create equilibrium but is actually creating confusion. A few years ago a euro was worth about eighty cents, not long ago it was up to a dollar fifty. This is not conducive to stable trade relations.

What do we see today? We have a serious financial crisis, we have a serious banking crisis, we have a serious exchange rate crisis. But we haven't added things together. I haven't heard anyone say that the president of the United States and the leaders of the European Union have met to discuss this, even though this is one of the major issues that we need to deal with. Of course, the ministers of finance have met and the governors of central banks have met, but has anybody addressed such issues as: Is it sustainable to have, on the two sides of the Atlantic, interest rates, decided by the central banks, that are as different as they are today? Wouldn't it be good for the US President, along with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman of the Fed, to meet with the European Union President and the President of the euro group, which is the group of ministers of finance along with the head of the European Central Bank, to discuss these issues? But they have not met to discuss these issues, they have not taken the slightest initiative in

this regard. And yet this type of discussion could lead us to solutions. Here is a positive proof of what more can be done. We need an upgraded system for meeting together at the highest levels, because this can produce results.

On currencies, I believe that we should look at an approach that would resemble what used to be the European Monetary System (EMS). In it, there were ranges or thresholds for the currency exchange rates, and guidelines for how the governors of central banks work. The same thing was done in the G-5 under the Louvre Accord. I was Minister of Finance at the time, James Baker was in charge of the Treasury under President Reagan. Exchange rates had been fluctuating and people understood that it was going beyond the fundamentals; it was affecting trade and there was talk of a protectionist crisis. We came up with an agreement that made it possible to stabilize exchange rates. It worked fairly well for a time; the crisis was dissipated. A year later, in 1987, it was forgotten; a Wall Street crash came along, and it undermined everything we had done. Now we are once again paying high costs for currency fluctuations. We need to try again, and this time make it last, as it did in the European system.

As regards military issues, we will need to rebalance the functioning of the Atlantic Alliance for a better distribution of responsibilities, update the NATO strategic concept, and clarify the conditions for it to intervene outside of its traditional geographical area, which is itself expanding, and the rules allowing its members to intervene in one or another region of the world without the consent of their allies while nonetheless using the instruments of the Alliance. These reforms will become possible if the EU reorganizes itself, with flexibility for cooperation in a "variable geometry", and if a serious military cooperation develops among its major Western European countries.

The Atlantic Alliance is still useful. It is intended to unite us. Yet it is out of balance, so great is the self-assurance of one side of the ocean and the resignation of the other. Our relations are strained.

I would ask you to picture our situation this way: Europe and America are threatened by identical risks. We have common interests far stronger than those that divide us, shared convictions, a single civilization, a shared vision of man's role in the world. Everything should draw us closer together. Yet we cling to quarrels of another time, as if the world had not changed, as if we were still in a position to contend alone for world domination.

We need to open our eyes before it is too late—before our divisions have done us irreparable damage. Sometimes it seems that it is our divisions that people would rather cultivate, with persistent care. Yet, whatever people may say, Europe has no better possible ally than America. And America has no better possible ally than Europe.

Europe and America do have an underlying unity, despite all the differences that are played out in various international theaters, and that give people so much cause to doubt it. To unite us, there is a powerful transatlantic economy. There is also a deep community—a community of civilization and of the very concept of freedom and of life in society. We both believe in democracy, and, while we put it into practice to varying degrees, we do so far more than the other parts of the world.

What remains to be done is to breathe new life into this western unity, and build common institutions that enable us to act together in the world. We are no longer the exclusive holders of power, but the prosperity and peace of the world still depend to a great extent on our cohesion. With still over 55% of global GDP, the North Atlantic will remain the commercial and financial hub of the world for a long time to come. A political existence needs to be given to this space.

To face up to the most serious issues, it is not enough to improve our existing cooperation. We need a new organization, a fresh departure. We must be bold and build a true Union traversing the two shores of the ocean.

The Union should have an Executive Council, convening the presidents of the U.S. and EU every three months, with support staff to prepare and follow up on their work. A more effective European Union, with ratification of the Lisbon Treaty which provides for a longer term EU president, is necessary in order to create this Council. If the Council has positive results, then the Union of the West will be able to go farther. It will need solid institutional instruments. To be frank, however, I do not see this as a possibility yet; it will be the task of the entire next generation.

Americans still believe that very little can be accomplished without their leadership. This is true today, but won't be for long. Within twenty years, sea changes will occur in the balance of power. Time is of the essence.

A revolution of mindset is needed, both in Europe and the United States. Each must give up nostalgic ways of thinking. It is the kind of revolution that creates a future.

Comments

Stanley Sloan*:
How to go forward with this initiative

Prime Minister Balladur has put out some very important suggestions. I think they need to be heard.

It is impressive, to begin with, that he has come forward with these ideas. Political leaders have a responsibility to look beyond current problems and try to imagine the future, not to just accept the status quo. Those of us in the academic environment perhaps have a responsibility to contribute ideas; political leaders have a responsibility to try to turn ideas into action and Prime Minister Balladur has set out on that path.

As he has discovered, there is plenty of skepticism among observers, experts, and politicians here about the goal that he sets out, a very impressive goal. I am familiar with the resistance that he has talked about to these kinds of ideas. I myself am an unreconstructed Atlanticist; I think the values, the interests and the futures of the United States and Europe are inextricably linked. It may not always be convenient to say this, it may not always be politically correct, it may even appear not to be true at times when we argue with each other, but I believe that is the bottom line of our relationship.

Nearly a decade ago I was working on an interpretive history of the transatlantic relationship. At the end of my book, after trying to do what I could have done at the Congressional Research Service—an objective, non-partisan analysis—I advocated an Atlantic Community Treaty Organization. One of the questions that I was asked was: What would this organization do? What kinds of meetings would it have? Put some meat on the bones. And so I prepared a draft of a new Atlantic Community Treaty, spelling out the terms of it, discussing how it would work and how after 9/11 it would have helped the United State and Europe respond to the attacks. Then there was this interesting response: Some very bright and intelligent American and European diplomats said, we've got so many meetings already, we've got so many organizations already, how could I convince my Minister to approve another organization, another set of meetings? I would respond by saying, I can come up with several of these organizations and meetings that probably could be eliminated and make plenty of time in your Minister's schedule. Then of course you incur the wrath of those people who have a stake in *those* organizations—but in any case, I understand very well the kind of criticism that you are encountering.

It is of course not unreasonable to ask those of use who are proposing a new organization to suggest ways of making it manageable as part of the relationship. It is one of the challenges in following up on this kind of proposal.

Another question I encountered when putting together my proposal, and that is relevant also to the Prime Minister's, was: Who you would include in this organization?

* Stanley Sloan has worked at the CIA as NATO and European Community desk officer and Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe; and, from 1975 to 1999, at the Congressional Research Service, where he became Senior Specialist in International Security Policy. He is presently visiting Scholar at the Rohatyn Center for International Affairs at Middlebury College. His is most recent book is *NATO, the European Union and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged* (2005). He spoke at this colloquium on behalf of the Streit Council, as a member of its advisory board.

I concluded that the best way to start would be to start with all of the members of the European Union and all of the members of NATO. If you just make the arrangement between the United States and the European Union, you leave out countries that really ought to be included—Canada, Turkey, Norway—while some European Union countries in turn are not members of NATO. I would suggest this perhaps as an amendment to the Prime Minister's proposal. The details, as the Prime Minister said, can be discussed; it is the principle that is important: the principle of intensified cooperation between the United States and Europe.

There is a problem in requiring that Europe get its act together, by approving the Treaty of Lisbon, before embarking on this intensified transatlantic cooperation. The fact that the Lisbon Treaty faces an uncertain future reminds me of how important it is to look at European integration as a process.

It is something I made note of many years ago, when drafting the first-ever formal estimate by the U.S. intelligence community on European integration. Following Henry Kissinger's declaration that 1973 would be the "year of Europe" in U.S. foreign policy, the intelligence community decided to produce an estimate on the European Community's future. As a European analyst at the CIA, in between assignments to the U.S. delegation to East-West troop reduction talks in Vienna, I was designated to draft the estimate. In the draft, I used an expression that had been used by a few academics but which had not been prominent in U.S. government assessments, referring to the dynamic in Europe as that of a "*uniting* Europe." The draft (and completed estimate) concluded that the final outcome of the process might remain very unclear for many years and could face a variety of advances and setbacks.

My point is that we should not wait for any particular development in the process of European integration before taking steps to intensify transatlantic cooperation. The European Union will continue to evolve toward an undefined end point; it is critically important that its further evolution take place within the framework of effective Atlantic community collaboration.

It is also important, if this idea moves ahead, that it move as something that is being done because it is seen as being consistent with the values and interests of the United States and Europe, and also in the best interests of peace and well being in the international community. It should not be done in a framework of creating new enemies. It should be a positive initiative. One can make it clear that other countries, if they are acting in ways consistent with the principles, would be welcome, if not to become members, certainly to become cooperating partners in this effort.

That said, I think it is a very constructive initiative and I hope the principle of enhanced cooperation helps guide the future of US-European relations in the coming US administration.

Edouard Balladur: Response to Stanley Sloan

It is true that this is a proposal that has triggered a certain degree of skepticism. This form of the skepticism is not the same in Europe and in the US. In the US, the response would mainly be, why would we need this? Things are going pretty well. In Europe and in particular France, there is another feeling, which is that you do not want to find yourself trapped into an exclusive relationship with the United States. There is the idea that Europe is also about relations with Russia and with the Mediterranean region, and you would not want this framework to undermine such relations.

If we are candid here you might also want to mention the sense of distrust vis-a-vis the United States because the United States is very powerful, and because you get this impression that the United States prefers to speak with different partners taken in isolation rather than taken together. But what I am advocating here is a balanced relationship with two partners on equal footing where we have populations which are about the same, and economic outputs which are about the same. Militarily there is a big difference because the US makes an effort that the Europeans are not making, even though they will have to in the future; again the idea is to have a balanced relationship. In order to have this, first of all we need Europe to organize itself, and also to make efforts which it has not made.

Now regarding this new organization and the idea that you would want to include all of the member states of NATO. Well, why not? In Europe we have the notion of various circles: those who are part of the European Union, and those who are doing additional important things such as the euro. Half of the European Union members are part of the euro zone. And then we have the other countries, which have various special arrangements for cooperation. We have just suggested for instance an enhanced type of cooperation with Ukraine. We have the same type of relationship with Turkey as well as with a number of North African states. So there are a number of relations between Europe and its neighbors. Now, how would you want these neighbors, such as Turkey, Ukraine, or Norway to be represented? That's something that we would need to discuss. I do believe that you would want to have some type of representation for these states. You would not want to have a separation here.

Daniel Hamilton*:

Union must build on the Atlantic acquis

This is a courageous effort by the Prime Minister. The easiest thing to do would be to criticize it, by pointing to all of the differences in policy across the Atlantic, or to underlying trends, demographic or economic or political, that might be pulling us apart. But that would distract us. We need to look at the proposal and what it might mean for us.

When you put forward a proposal like this, it is of course hard to outline everything in advance. Still one can ask: What would this Union actually consist of? How would it come about from where we are today? What is the foundation upon which to build?

I believe there is a foundation. One way to think about it is to use Euro jargon. In the European Union one talks about the 'acquis', the accumulation of what Europe has achieved in integration, with all the principals and regulations that comprise the European Union today, and that those who aspire to join have to sign up to. I would argue that there is also such a thing as an 'acquis Atlantique'. It is not written down as much, certainly not in the lengthy volumes that the EU has come up with, but it is the foundation upon which one can build. A former student of David Calleo at SAIS, a

* Daniel Hamilton has held several senior positions in the State Department, including Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, responsible for NATO, OSCE and transatlantic security issues, U.S. Special Coordinator for Southeast European Stabilization, Associate Director of the Policy Planning Staff, and Senior Policy Advisor to the U.S. Ambassador in Germany. He is author of a number of works on transatlantic relations. He is presently Professor and Director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of Johns Hopkins University.

German national named Peter Barschdorff[2], has written a dissertation on the 'acquis Atlantique'. He includes documents, dating from the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 to the Transatlantic declaration of 1990 when the Cold War was ending, and the new Transatlantic agenda between the US and the EU in 1995. I would add the Washington declaration of 1999, with its short statement of common principles and norms.

We say all the time that we agree on these principles, but when one looks at them, one sees there are some basic principles and processes that, having evolved over time, affect how a proposal like the present one would work. One is nondiscrimination, a core principle that would have to be applied. Another, which had to become a reality after the end of the Cold War, is what I would call 'the open door': this community is open, undefined in its end state, and others could join if they meet the criteria and the principles the others have evolved. Another is, to keep your word and carry out your agreements. Finally, a process that you could call constructive abstention: if you don't agree with where the basic community is going, don't try to undermine it, step back, opt out on some aspect, but don't hold the whole thing up.

We don't always honor these processes, on either side of the Atlantic; often they are honored in a breach. But when we do dishonor them by some action or other, the reaction says something about the relation. The reaction of the partner is not often, 'why did you do that?' it's usually, 'how could you have done that?' It is a very different reaction than we have with many other countries. The expectation is that the members are going to follow these practices. It is a more emotional relationship; the closest relationships are the ones that contain the most emotion. The biggest arguments are usually the ones in the family. This underscores the notion that there is something real here, a foundation upon which one could build if one wished.

Today we are in a different world. It is an open but fleeting moment. One could try to identify elements to reshape the agenda. As to a forum in which that could take place, it would seem to me that we do need some sort of way in which all EU and NATO member states would be able to talk to each other and not be split up.

When I was in the State Department, we used to go around with what we called the 'Euro mess'. It simply showed all of the circles of the European countries and who is in what group. Actually, the fact that there are overlapping, integrated institutions creates a certain sense of security, so let's not worry if institutions overlap, it's whether they are doing anything that is the issue.

The institutions were geared back then to a particular transformation, that of stabilizing the European continent. That was most of our agenda. Today our agenda is still that in the wider Europe, but it is not such an overwhelming part of our agenda. We have a whole new agenda about the world at large. Now the question is whether Europeans and Americans are prepared to work together to deal with a major range of issues beyond Europe that neither one of us can deal with alone very well.

There is yet one more agenda, which is in fact an objective reality: that we are not drifting apart when it comes to our societies, we are virtually colliding. The integration between our two continents is much greater today than it was during the Cold War. In terms of the integrative factors, we've become much closer together than ever before in

[2] The work has been published: Peter Barschdorff, *Facilitating Transatlantic Cooperation After The Cold War: An Acquis Atlantique* (New York, Palgrave, 2001), also http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/search-handle-url/ref=ntt_athr_dp_sr_1?%5Fencoding=UTF8&search-type=ss&index=books&field-author=Peter%20Barschdorff [Ed.]

our history. We're more tied to each other and have a greater stake in each other's economic success than we have ever had before.

There are initiatives underway to tackle the agenda posed by this reality. But as yet they don't have the sense of lift, or the sense of priority, that the Prime Minister is trying to give. That is the distinctive element of his proposal.

If you look at the New Transatlantic Agenda, the basic framework for US-EU relations as agreed in 1995, it is very ambitious in scope. It has all sorts of things we should have been doing. It has one hundred and fifty joint actions we should be taking. But if you go to these meetings, you see that the principals sit there with a brief and look dully at it. They have part of a day; every issue takes up about thirty seconds of their time. There has been some improvement, but it is a process without direction. There is not a sense of prioritization. There is not a strategic point to it; the US-EU relationship is still non-strategic. It has not got this sense that the alliance used to have. It needs a different type of focus. And it needs to be redone.

The Prime Minister proposes an integrated transatlantic market. Today there is the Transatlantic Economic Council, and that is exactly, almost obsessively, what it is supposed to be doing: to start to clear away barriers. The model is not a trade agreement but a single transatlantic market as a goal. And yet where are we? We are hung up on the definition of what constitutes a clean chicken. This is what is holding up the single market across the Atlantic. Unfortunately it is a Franco-American issue. This is the reality: if people are not really committed to the goal and the priority, 'clean chickens' will define your agenda. It becomes ludicrous. That is where we stand.

We have to reflect: what is distinctive about this relationship today in the world that we are in, rather than the world that we were in? It is distinctive at least in one sense: if we do agree across the Atlantic, we are almost always the core of a global coalition that gets something done. And if we disagree across the Atlantic, we are almost always the brake on any global coalition that gets anything done. We cannot say that about any other relationship. That is still what makes this relationship distinctive.

Further: the US might believe it is the indispensable power, and we might also believe that this relationship is indispensable. Yet even this is insufficient. We can get together; in the end we need also to get together with others. If we try to define the West against the rest, or without the rest, we will end up with a world without the West. The principle of nondiscrimination, open door, or inclusion has to be part of this. We often can lead the way on issues but the others have to come along. We have to restructure our institutions to take account of the changing calculus of power. Somehow this has to be done with the notion that others are involved and can participate, and are equal players. If we can do that, then together we can extend our influence. And we can advance our values and interests.

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Edouard Balladur: Response to Hamilton

You are quite right: there is an "acquis Atlantique", and a very significant one at that. In the military field and in a number of fields there is an acquis Atlantique. It is extremely helpful; we would have to draw on that.

But at the same time, I have to be extremely clear here: It is not based on the Atlantic Alliance that we can come up with this Union. The Atlantic Alliance is a very useful one, it has been useful in the past and it still is, but it bears the marks of its origin, since it was built in the framework of the Cold War in order to protect Europe.

Anything based upon the Atlantic Alliance would seem a little backward looking in the minds of public opinion. We should take it into account, but not use it as the starting point. That is why I am talking about a new organization that would of course include NATO but is not based on it and doesn't take it as a starting point.

You also spoke of a common market. It is exactly what I actually had in mind. I think we need to come up with an Atlantic common market, with rules regarding competition, rules regarding trade legislation and tax legislation, rules that make it possible for us to operate it smoothly.

Regarding the open door, I don't think you can close a door forever; however, you can close a door for a limited time or temporarily. I think that the enlargement of EU today is no longer possible, there are twenty seven of us, that is a lot. A number of members have not yet reached normal living standards in Europe. We don't want to go too fast, otherwise we would be creating a number of problems. I would venture that nothing more is possible until the Lisbon Treaty is ratified.

At the same time, I go back to this notion of circles that we have in Europe. It allows us to bring aboard a number of neighboring countries that are not part of the EU, through association treaties that deal with financial issues and trade issues.

I have always been against saying that we need to set the final geographic borders of the Union. I am not in favor of saying, 'this is who is a European, and this is who is not a European, this is who is a member of the Atlantic Alliance, and this is who is not'. Rather, it is an open question. I would start with the obvious states, and then gradually over the years we will see what problems arise and how we want to solve them.

Audience Questions

McCain's League of Democracies proposal

Q. What do you think of the proposal of Senator McCain for a worldwide League of Democracies?

Balladur: To respond directly and frankly, I really don't think that this league of democracies is a good idea. Personally, I don't approve of this idea. And I wouldn't want to be the one to decide who is and is not a democracy. Japan is a democracy, Australia is a democracy; but when you get into the African continent things become more complicated. It's a different matter for us to discuss advanced countries only.

Is it realistic to hold more U.S.-EU summits?

Q. You are proposing four summits a year. Some time ago, U.S.-EU summits were reduced from two to one a year; apparently they did not seem useful enough. Instead of a new institution, would it be better to make the existing US-EU summits work better and put more meat on them?

Balladur: What would the Council add to the U.S.-EU summits? Quite simply, that it would be systematic and regular.

Would it not be better to use something that already exists? This does, in fact, already exist. I'm simply proposing that the meetings take place more frequently. And that we establish a permanent European-American secretariat for them, which would be similar to the G8 system. If the number of summits has been reduced because they're not useful, we need to look at the fact that even on a national level politicians and government authorities take time to meet and they don't always come to a conclusion. It's not something that's specific to the international level. I'm not claiming that this type of a system would be a substitute for political will. If countries don't want to do anything, they're not going to.

One additional factor: I'm proposing that these meetings proceed, especially on the European side, with officials who are capable of making decisions. This underlines the importance of ratifying the Lisbon Treaty. The problem on the European side is to create a political authority that can speak for Europe. In our current system, with the six-month presidency in the EU, the president has no decision-making powers. If we adopt the Lisbon treaty we will have a presidency that has a term of two and a half years, renewable one time, so a total of five years. This will be a more serious partner.

Is there support for a Union of the West?

Q. It is almost flattering to be hearing this from a Frenchman. I wonder what responses you have had to your proposal in other parts of Europe—whether other parts of Europe would be as eager for a union with the United States.

Balladur: I was in Germany months ago and had the opportunity to meet with German leaders and ministers. Some of them were very enthusiastic about this idea. But that's all I can say at this point. Their enthusiasm has not yet been translated into public support.

In my meetings here in Washington, what I have perceived is significant interest, but I haven't really perceived a will, if you please. I'm sure this situation will change. Again, this is a long term endeavor. And let me say this, I think this initiative will have to be put forward by the European Union.

I would like in the end to say that I am happy with the interest you have expressed regarding these proposals, and I am impressed by the force of the various comments that you made. I have not submitted to you a finalized plan with all of the rules and all of the details nicely fine-tuned, after taking everything into account; that is not how things work. When we started Europe, sixty years ago, we did not talk about the common market, we started talking about steel and coal. Then we started talking about trade unification, little by little we started talking about legislative harmonization. Now we have a common currency and still more things. This was all a gradual process. What is important is that we get the momentum going. I think once we have this momentum, gradually we will solve the issues that are put before us.

"Global NATO", "League of Democracies", "Union of the West": *Complementary or Contradictory?*

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Introduction: The relation of Global NATO to the League and Union proposals

NATO has in recent years been undergoing processes dubbed "globalization" or "Global NATO": expansion of NATO missions worldwide, development of NATO partnerships around the world, and special close relations with a few far-flung countries such as Australia and Japan. The sources and implications of the Global NATO processes are examined in the articles by Emiliano Alessandri and Neil Bhatiya in the pages below.

This introduction puts Global NATO in the context of its relation to two current proposals: the proposal for a global "League of Democracies" on the one side, and the proposal for a "Union of a West" on the other side.

"Global NATO" or Global "League of Democracies"?

Proposals for a global "League of Democracies" or "Concert of Democracies" have made a large splash in the present year, finding their way into the presidential campaign. Senator John McCain has taken up the call for a new "League of Democracies" as his central foreign policy plank. Advisers to Senator Barack Obama have also advocated such a league, with minor variations. There is a domestic political momentum behind the idea.

A global League of Democracies would lie somewhere in the space in-between NATO and the UN—the same space that NATO has been entering into by its processes of "going Global". In the 1980s and 1990s, an earlier attempt had been made to fill this space under the name of a global "Community of Democracies". The Community of Democracies was in fact created in 2000. However, it has had little effect.

Experts evaluating the current proposals for a new League have recognized their attractiveness. They combine two of the most appealing values in international affairs: democracy and universality. Experts have cautioned that, for this very reason, expectations for them are greatly overblown. Their combination of values raises a tantalizing hope: the hope of arriving quickly at a democratic world order. This hope is however left vague, as it would not be easy to outline a realistic path for getting from a formal grouping of all democracies to an effective structure of world order in the present era. The already existing Community of Democracies raised the same hopes, and its practice since its creation has provided evidence that little can be accomplished along these lines. Thomas Carothers has elaborated ways in which the new League proposals try to get around this evidence of limited value by adjusting the Community in some details, but concluded that none of the various adjustments would affect the reasons for the limited value.[3]

In 2006-7 there was a very different discussion. It was not on a new League but an ongoing trend in NATO, one that came to be crystallized in the slogan of "Global NATO". This too aimed, as we have indicated, at filling in some of the space between

[3] Thomas Carothers, "Is a League of Democracies a Good Idea?" (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008). Carothers is Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment and has written extensively on democracy promotion.

the Atlantic and global systems; the name itself was evidence of that. However, its method was bottom up rather than top down: by extending the membership, partnerships, and global missions of the most powerful of the Atlantic institutions, NATO, rather than by creating a new institution likely to have few if any powers.

The two main approaches to filling the space—Global NATO on the one side, the Community of Democracies and proposed Concert on the other—have thus far been compatible in practice, even complementary. There is a huge amount of space to be filled between the Atlantic and global circles; no single institution can come near to filling it completely in this era.

Despite this compatibility to date, in the future, tensions could arise between the Community (or Concert) and the more effective structures bordering it on either side—the UN and NATO. This would happen, for example, if the Community (Concert) came to be treated as a substitute for the other institutions. A few of its proponents already view it this way. Both the UN and NATO are viewed with distaste by large, if opposite, constituencies: the UN for neutralism vis-à-vis non-democracies, NATO for militantly taking sides in the Cold War and after. A global Community or Concert of Democracies, as a verbally attractive alternative, provides a meeting ground where the opponents of both institutions can join hands behind the same slogans and talk, at least on the surface, on the same side of the fence. As such, it could someday have unintended consequences, damaging the UN, or NATO, or both. This risk will remain as long as expectations for the Community or Concert are kept at an unrealistically high level.

Global NATO, by contrast, does not aim at a perfect synthesis of Atlanticism and globalism, one that might replace them both. Rather, it aims at an extension of Atlanticism in its role as a substructure of globalism. It would be a further link between the UN system and the Atlantic system of institutions. These systems are already related, as outer circle to inner circle, or overall system to core subsystem. The looseness of the outer UN system had always led it to recognize its need for regional subsystems to fill in its missing spaces. After 1991, it began to recognize the Atlantic system as well, formally as "regional", actually as a unique core subsystem.

Significantly, both approaches have been received coolly by some European countries. The Community of Democracies has long suffered from lack of support from the core European cohort of democracies, with France as its sharpest critic among this number. The "Global NATO" proposal in turn has been resisted as a possible dilution of the close links Europeans had with the U.S., but this view is more susceptible to change.

Late in 2007 Nicolas Sarkozy became President of France. He has taken a widely-remarked pro-Atlantic posture, doing much to reinvigorate trans-Atlantic relations. Edouard Balladur, long the mentor of Sarkozy and the mainstay of the Atlanticism of his wing of the Gaullist movement, has in his new book endorsed the extension of the field of action of NATO, past if not necessarily future extensions of NATO membership, a new global strategic concept for NATO, and rules for use of NATO resources out of area without full consensus among the allies.

The central argument of Balladur's book, *For a Union of the West*[4], is the need for a trans-Atlantic union in the sphere of foreign policy, one capable of dealing with all global issues. It is a proposition that is considerably more substantive, if less popular,

[4] Edouard Balladur, Pour une Union occidentale entre l'Europe et les Etats-Unis (Paris, Fayard, 2007).

than the League of Democracies. And "Global NATO", despite French reticence about some aspects of it, would seem a necessary element for the success of his plan.

"Global NATO" as a key to Balladur's "Union of the West"

A union of the foreign policies of the Western countries is—excepting the courageous use of the word "union"—part and parcel of the mainstream evolving Atlanticism of the era of the war on terror. Balladur speaks of the need for a foreign policy union of the West on the entirety of global affairs in this era, in contrast to earlier periods when it was enough for the Atlantic Alliance to defend free Europe against other European powers. This is the crux of his argument.

The greatest weakness of Balladur's book is that it does not in fact suggest a path to a foreign policy Union. It makes specific and realistic proposals for completing the economic union that already halfway exists between Europe and America, adding a U.S.-EU Council as an institutional support. However, for his core goal of a foreign policy Union, all that it proposes—perhaps all that can be proposed on the U.S.-EU level—is additional consultations in the same U.S.-EU Council.

In economics Balladur has the advantage of a substantial "acquis" (cumulatively acquired integration) to build on. The acquis was developed over the course of half a century by the complex, two-tiered system of Western unity—EU and OECD—that grew out of the Marshall Plan and constitutes a sort of split-level common home. In security and foreign policy he could build similarly on the acquis of NATO, but has been reluctant to do so.

Nevertheless, the globalization trends in NATO are already gradually developing, not a complete foreign policy Union by any means, but a much wider scope of foreign policy cooperation among the Atlantic countries than they ever had before. These processes are already putting some of the missing flesh on the central goal of Balladur.

What is problematic in his book is the almost uniform darkness of the picture it paints of present-day Atlantic relations. The result is a lack of filler for the vast space between the goal of Union and the immediate proposals; one is left with a sense of a lack of support structures for the goal of Union, apart from the support provided by the need for it.

The need for Union is not an unimportant support, to be sure: it can motivate the will. However, much more support is available, and could provide the sense of realism that is so important for giving confidence to people that it is safe to proceed along this line.

This support can be found in the very existence of NATO and of a number of other Atlantic institutions such as OECD and G-7; in the expansion of NATO membership and partnerships since 1991; and in the global extension of NATO missions. Significant progress has been made since 1991, through NATO, on the goal of Atlantic unity on global foreign policy issues. It is progress that, despite its many insufficiencies compared to the current and future need, is quite impressive when compared to the entire previous century.

Prior to 1991 the Atlantic countries, despite intense alliances for defense of free Europe in World Wars and Cold War, remained divided on wider global issues, American opposed the European empires, leading the NATO Treaty to avoid including the colonial territories of free Europe in its defense perimeter, and Europeans reciprocated with reluctance to sign on to American policies around the world. This began changing

with the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s, and more so with the war on terror after 2001. The changes are still slow and small when viewed statically against what is needed for dealing with the global problems and challenges to the West; yet are rapid and huge when viewed historically against the failure for the previous hundred years, despite frequent efforts, to arrive at such common policies. Balladur's proposal can be seen as one for carrying this trend farther and faster, as is objectively needed, and for giving it a goal of completion in the sense of becoming commensurate with the need.

—*Editor*

Global NATO

Its place in the evolving Atlanticist tradition

by Emiliano Alessandri*

The slogan "Global NATO" made it into the limelight in 2006-7, then faded deep into obscurity. Nevertheless the processes of globalization continue in NATO to this day, and can be expected to continue well into the future. These processes are addressing, imperfectly and incompletely, but in actual practice, the central concern of Balladur's *Union of the West*: the uniting of the West on global foreign policy issues.

The "Global NATO" idea made its splash in 2006 when two distinguished foreign-policy analysts advocated it in a much-remarked article under that title in *Foreign Affairs*.[1] After that, similar proposals multiplied. The Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Tom Lantos, spoke in 2007 in favour of NATO's enlargement to Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea.[2] NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer emphasized the need to further strengthen NATO's ties with the ever-growing number of its "global partners".

As is often the case when emphatic formulas are put forward, "Global NATO" lent itself to different interpretations, and the NATO allies were divided on whether or not to endorse it. This article argues that, in many important respects, the "globalization" of NATO is already underway. It is a phenomenon to which all members have contributed. What seems to be lacking is the vision and leadership to guide this change, and clarity of definition.

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Defining "Global NATO"

First, a word of definition. The phrase "Global NATO" encapsulated two distinct processes: 1) NATO taking up missions worldwide, overcoming the old geographical limitations in its work; 2) development of NATO partnerships with countries all around the world, along with proposals for new formal members in the Pacific.

The phrase itself, "Global NATO", by conflating the two processes, lent itself to misperceptions; it seemed to imply a global scope for new membership proposals. Many of its friends and foes alike were energized by these misperceptions. Europeans feared the Atlantic group was being dissolved into a global group; but the actual mainstream proposals for new NATO members under the "Global NATO" rubric were limited to a few countries that were already a part of the Atlantic economic structure (OECD) and have been working quietly with the Atlantic Alliance for decades. The numerous other global partnerships were to remain accessory relationships, like spokes sticking out from the NATO wheel. The goal was a NATO that would be global in missions, with global

* Emiliano Alessandri is a doctoral candidate under David Reynolds at the University of Cambridge, and has just completed a year as visiting researcher at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University.

[1] Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, "Global Nato", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 85, no. 5, September/October 2006, pp. 105-113.

[2] "Why Can't NATO Go Global", Reuters, 22 June 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSN2218656320070622

partnership connections, and a world-spanning but essentially Western not global membership.

When NATO's 2008 Summit decisions fell short of the most far-reaching Global NATO proposals, many writers concluded that Global NATO had failed. This underestimated the globalization processes still in operation; it was a mirror of the earlier, opposite exaggeration of the revolutionary character of "Global NATO". Most of the globalization process continued unhindered after the Summit: expansion of NATO's special partnership relationships with Japan, Australia, and South Korea; expansion of NATO's other partnerships worldwide; and expansion of NATO's missions. Already in the new strategic concept NATO adopted in the 1990s, the main missions were out-of-area and tending toward a global reach; what needed to be added was not the global scope but the sharp new security focus for it, imposed by the struggle with terrorism in the 21st century.

The gap in Vision

Now to the question of vision. In order to find the necessary vision for making public sense of Global NATO, the Atlantic allies would profit from a recovery of the thinking of Atlanticism in the past century and even earlier. Contrary to popular belief, Atlanticism did not begin in 1949 but in the late 1800s. From its very inception, as we shall see, it advanced a "worldview" concerned with the maintenance of peace and order, not only in the Atlantic region but in the international system as a whole. At the same time it focused on supporting the international forces of democracy, whose core straddled the two shores of the North Atlantic, in their struggle against authoritarian and extremist powers. It is a matter that is still relevant today.

Even though the meaning of "NATO going global" has not been clearly articulated, in practice, NATO's development since its creation shows a coherent direction, encompassing the globe while maintaining definite Atlanticist foundations and constraints. Recovery of the roots of globalization in Atlanticist thinking would make it possible to understand the continuing Atlanticist constraints on the process as reliable and constructive; it would help calm the fears that exist from two opposite ends—that it is not going far enough, and that by venturing beyond the Atlantic it is dissolving the Atlantic.

Historical processes of globalization in NATO

The "globalization" of NATO is a multi-layered process, already at an advanced stage. Since its inception, NATO has steadily expanded its functions, enlarged its membership, and extended the perimeter of its operations. Since the end of the Cold War it has continued all three processes at a conspicuously accelerated pace, while also intensifying its cooperation with non-NATO ("partnership") countries.

NATO has been assuming functions that far exceed those required of a military alliance strictly for the territorial defense of its members. Its 1949 Treaty already envisaged a wide range of cooperative functions that it encouraged in Articles II and IV and the preamble, ranging from cooperation against threats to the peace to cooperation on economic intercourse and on democratic values, and a global scope within which it could exercise these functions. It was only the defense of its members' territory, in Articles V and VI in the Treaty, that was restricted geographically to that territory; and was further restricted to the metropolitan not colonial territory of its members, since

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America had a negative attitude toward the empires of the Western European democracies and did not want to assume obligations for defending their imperial holdings. Since 1991, NATO's broader security functions have come into play in far-flung locations. NATO forces are now being extensively employed in peace-keeping missions, post-war reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. In the context of the international campaign against terrorism, NATO is engaged in both Afghanistan and in Iraq, places that would have formerly been considered far "out of area". As its Secretary General has authoritatively noted, NATO troops are now deployed systematically, and not only episodically, outside of Europe, regularly operating on three continents.[3] NATO has enlarged from the 12 original members in 1949 to 26 today, while also establishing over 20 other "partnerships", starting with the Partnership for Peace (PFP) launched in 1994.

All NATO members have endorsed these changes in function, operational perimeter and membership. All have thus supported this evolution, albeit not all with the same degree of enthusiasm. NATO was not dismantled at the end of the Cold War, when many contended that it had lost its *raison d'etre*. On the contrary, the NATO allies invested in its future. At the 50th anniversary in 1999, NATO's "strategic concept" was revised by consensus, adapting the Alliance to the reality of a post-bipolar world. In various summits since, the NATO allies have confirmed the commitment to evolve. At the Prague Summit in 2002, seven new countries were invited to join. At the Istanbul Summit in 2004—which took place after the transatlantic crisis of 2003 over Iraq—the globalization of NATO was further reinforced, as the countries participating in the "Mediterranean dialogue" became formal NATO partners. Despite many divisions among the Allies as to the best strategy for coping with terrorism and with instability in the Islamic world, the "Istanbul Cooperative Initiative" was launched with those countries in the Middle East (so far, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates) interested in consulting with NATO members on strategic and security matters.

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When domestic politics took the place of shared vision

What seems to be lacking is thus not the will to transform and enhance the Alliance, but a vision to guide this evolution, and leadership to cope with the many challenges along the way. Despite the rather impressive transformation so far, the NATO allies still seem reluctant to draw the necessary conclusions. Within Europe, NATO's mission and functions are clearly defined, but outside the transatlantic area the Alliance has proceeded only on an *ad hoc* basis, and with no clear view of what the methods and ultimate goals of NATO's operations should be. NATO's engagement in post-Saddam Iraq is a sign that the NATO allies have put aside the dispute that arose in 2003, when the US invaded that country. But NATO's rather limited role—confined to the training of new Iraqi security forces—testifies to the fact that the Allies are still working out the exact terms of NATO's role in "nation-building" missions. In Afghanistan, NATO has gradually substituted for the U.S. command and U.S. forces on the ground, thus assuming a leading role in what remains the central front of the campaign against international terrorism. But faced with growing instability and mounting casualties, the Allies have divided on the issue of burden-sharing, and have failed so far to establish a clear mechanism for the generation of new forces.

[3] "Beyond the North Atlantic", interview by James Kitfield of NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, *National Journal*, vol. 38, no. 14, 8 April 2006, http://nationaljournal.com

NATO's outreach similarly seems to be lacking vision and leadership. The problems are both practical and political. The practical problems relate mainly to decision-making after the admission of new members. An alliance that works through consensus tends, by the nature of things, to become less efficient as more members are brought in. The political problems are related to the direction of future enlargement. There is a widespread view, nearing consensus in American and Canadian discussion, that NATO should offer membership to—or should at least establish more formal ties with—non-European countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea; and some also say Israel. But many European allies are leery of this move, pointing to risks involved and fearing a dilution of the Atlantic relation.

The idea of creating "global partnerships" built on the Partnership for Peace of 1994, the Mediterranean dialogue, and other partnerships that emerged after 9-11-2001. The phrase itself can be traced back at least to the end of 2005, and was embodied in a formal Anglo-American proposal at a meeting of the NATO foreign ministers in Sofia, Bulgaria in April 2006.[4] The rationale behind this proposal was two-fold.

First, there was a pragmatic consideration. For years now, the U.S. government has been requesting its European allies to raise their budgets for common defense closer to the US level. With little progress in this area, the US decided to seek contributions from non-NATO nations.

The second reason was more political, and had to do with the trans-Atlantic tensions seen in recent years. The first-term Bush administration was severely criticized by some European governments for its theorization and practice of "unilateralism." The statement by the former Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld—"generally, the mission will determine the coalition; the coalition should not determine the mission"—translated into the creation of *ad hoc* "coalitions of the willing". This was perceived by many at the time as a near-fatal blow to NATO as the privileged military institution of the West. Tightening the relationship between NATO and countries such as Australia and Japan could be seen as an attempt by the Bush administration to have it both ways: investing in the Alliance while substituting "global partnerships" for "coalitions of the willing". This would reaffirm the centrality of NATO, but would at the same time transform NATO by making the relationship between the Americans and the Europeans less exclusive. As is the case with NATO's new Eastern European members, NATO's global partners were expected to be more accommodating to the U.S. than are the original European members.

This view might have changed if the issue had arisen just a year later, when changes in government in Australia and Japan had led to ending some of their military activity in support of America's efforts in Afghanistan as well as Iraq, while the agreed NATO efforts of the European allies continued and grew in Afghanistan. Americans of the Europe-bashing sort might have become less attached to the proposal; Europeans might have become less opposed. Europeans have had a good experience of inclusion of Japan in the G-7, where it helps them achieve a larger and more effective balancing weight vis-à-vis America on issues such as global warming, without introducing any adversarial element to the balance. In the long run, the extension of NATO to the Pacific basin allies, approximating its membership to that of OECD, is likely to proceed less on the basis of the particular party sentiments and resentments that were visible in 2007, more on its general objective merits: merits for NATO as an organization serving the global

[4] For further information on the meeting: http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/04-april/e0427c.html.

security needs of its original members, and merits for the new countries as a way of participating more fully in international security management.

But the particular party and national fears weighed heavily in 2006-7, and shaped the way the politics of the issue divided at that time.

It comes as no surprise, in this light, that the idea of global NATO partnerships was received only tepidly in Europe. It was said in some quarters that the original rationale of NATO partnerships was to encourage stability and democratic reform on the Alliance's immediate Eastern flank, in order to re-unite the European continent after the division imposed by the Cold War.[5] The new global partnerships, instead, would include countries far beyond the borders of Europe and whose membership in the West—with the exception of South Korea—was not seriously challenged during the Cold War. Many Europeans also believe that the partnership on which efforts should be concentrated is that between NATO and the E.U., the exact terms of which are far from clear.[6]

It should be apparent, then, that the globalization of NATO brings up many issues that require vision and leadership.

Atlanticism then and now

There is a common tendency to see Atlanticism as only an ideological by-product of the Cold War; thus the denials of NATO's *raison d'etre* after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The reality is quite different. NATO was to be sure born during the bloc-building process early in the Cold War, but much of it already existed under its other name—"the Atlantic Alliance"—in the two World Wars. Much of the institutional strength of NATO derives from the fact that it builds on those two generations of earlier experience, in which the allies were pressed together by force of a life and death struggle; one need only think of the World War II origins of the Supreme Allied Commander.

It is, similarly, a mistake of perspective to think that the only objective in the late 1940s among Western leaders was to establish a regional bulwark against the threat posed by international Communism. The Atlanticist vision that inspired the creation of NATO had developed well before the outbreak of the Cold War. In fact, the individuals who created NATO had matured and developed their ideas during World War I and the interwar years. When history is periodized in terms of the post-1945 period, it lops off this main root of the Atlantic tree, introducing a basic mistake into the understanding of the thinking that went into NATO.

The sources of the Atlanticist vision go back still farther, into the late 1800s. That vision was, essentially, of a "union" of a core group of "experienced" democracies bordering the Atlantic. This nucleus was intended for global as well as regional missions. It might undertake some of its missions in cooperation with other countries, depending on their stage of economic and political development, as well as on the degree of convergence of their strategic and other primary interests.

[5] See, for instance, the considerations expressed in the recent report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), *Transforming NATO (. . .)—A Primer for the NATO Summit in Riga 2006*, 14 November 2006, http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,3590/type,1/

[6] See, The Atlantic Council of the United States (ACUS), The Indispensable Partnership, Transatlantic Relations Program, Issue Brief, November 2006, http://www.acus.org/docs/061110-Indispensable_Partnership.pdf

Clarence Streit, a founding father of modern Atlanticism, systematized in the 1930s the two-tiered conceptualization of Atlanticism that had been developing since the 1890s. The "mature" democracies and economically most developed countries—the first tier, consisting primarily of the Atlantic nations—would pool their resources to assure the maintenance of peace and order at the global level. This would favor a long-term evolution of the less developed nations—the second tier—to converge with the first. In 1939, when the most urgent problem was to prevent the worldwide spread of authoritarianism, Streit advocated "federal union" among the North Atlantic democracies. Streit's bold proposal did not stop with the initial creation of an "Atlantic union" but conceived it as the nucleus of a gradually evolving and expanding federation that would eventually embrace all mankind. Its proposed original membership included Australia and New Zealand. It specified Japan, alongside Germany and Italy, as prospective members in the relatively near term, once they had successfully transited to democracy. The union of democracies, centered on the Atlantic, would expand over time by admitting other like-minded nations.

Another early Atlanticist, the renowned American columnist Walter Lippmann, had propounded the "Atlantic Community" idea even earlier, during World War I. The problem, already then, was how to pool the resources of the democracies in the existential struggle against authoritarian nationalism, and how to create the conditions for the eventual establishment of a liberal world order.

The interwar years had seen Atlanticism develop as a critique, partly from within the Wilsonian movement, of the failing Wilsonian approach of achieving world order through reliance entirely on such universal institutions as could be immediately established. Broadly speaking, Atlanticists were those, on both sides of the Atlantic, who believed that the viable solution to the problems of international instability and war was to induce the democratic nations to team up and become the nucleus of world order, the underpinning and supplement for the weaker universal system, and the engine of reform for the rest of the world in the direction of greater political and economic freedom.

The motivation for NATO in 1949 certainly had something to do with urgent Cold War concerns in Europe. It also had something to do with the experience of the Second World War, with its deepened wartime Atlantic Alliance including a Supreme Allied Commander in Europe; and with the emergence of a near-consensus in America rejecting the isolationism that had prevented ratification of NATO's attempted precursor in 1919, the Anglo-American Treaty of Guarantee to France. These factors combined to finally supply a political will sufficient for overcoming all the old obstacles: the Atlantic powers were able to proceed in the late 1940s with negotiation and ratification of an enduring institutionalized Atlantic Alliance.

Once this longer context is understood, it becomes clear that the Cold War was only the immediate problem; the underlying problem with which Western leaders were grappling at the time was how to close the holes in the world system, embodied at the time in the stalemate of the UN. The Security Council, the UN's most powerful organ, had been created with a unit veto structure, in deference to great power tradition and to the need for American ratification; it was paralyzed by that same structure, at the time particularly by the repeated Soviet use of the veto. As the Senate debate on the North Atlantic Treaty clearly reveals—the Senate's Vandenberg Resolution, which opened the way to the pact, states it explicitly—the Atlantic Alliance was not only a regional agreement for the defense of Europe, but also a means to overcome the problems facing the UN, filling in spaces which the UN was meant to cover but for the time being could

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not cover. In this way it was intended to lay the foundations for a stable and peaceful international order, despite the uncooperative behavior of the Soviets.

Some of these problems are still with us today. The Soviet Union has dissolved, but the inherent weakness of universal institutions is still apparent. As was the case in the interwar years, and then again in the 1940s, this is due, among other things, to the co-membership of both democratic and non-democratic members within the United Nations, and the co-membership of countries at vastly different stages and levels of political and economic development. These factors are likely to be with us for some time to come.

Recovering the vision that fits the reality

The Cold War misleadingly accustomed us to thinking of the Atlantic community in restrictive terms, as a geographically delimited organization for the defense of Europe alone. Viewed through the longer telescope of history, however, Atlanticism has been a fairly comprehensive worldview. It has provided a coherent, realistic set of ideas about how to make the international system work to preserve peace and support the spread of democracy. It has motivated the building of collective institutions for this purpose, supplementary to the universal institutions but free of their inherent problems.

Today new enemies have replaced old ones, after a period of absence of major enemies. Nevertheless, the challenges facing the Atlantic community have remained largely the same: how to maintain peace, and strengthen democracy, in a world where authoritarianism still represents a concrete threat to free societies, and where world government remains a mirage. Western leaders need to understand the truth about the origins of Atlanticism, and concomitantly, its true vision.

It is instructive that the globalization of NATO had its greatest acceleration, a sort of "take off", in the 1990s, in the absence of major enemies. It was, in this structural respect, the period most similar to that of the 1890s, when the Atlantic idea was first developed. The arrival of new enemies has entailed a focus on deepening the collective work of the Alliance in its already worldwide scope, to make it more effective; Global NATO is as much about this as about a further widening.

The underlying motivations for Atlanticism have held impressively invariant through all the geopolitical transformations of the last hundred years. The Atlantic structures have grown accordingly over the course of the century, in stages that have been cumulative, unlike the geopolitical transformations external to them. The ongoing "globalization" of NATO flows from this unvarying foundation; it is strikingly close to the original ideas of Atlanticism. Far from an uncontrolled new process to be wary of, it is the logical outgrowth of the strategy that the West has been following for more than half a century.

NATO's Third Era?

The Question of a Global NATO

By Neil Bhatiya*

Since the end of the Cold War competition in the early 1990s, there has been much search for a new overall orienting conception in international affairs. Those who prevailed in the Cold War—the United States and its allies in Europe and in East Asia—have struggled to develop a methodology for advancing their security and their political and economic ideals across the globe. Successive NATO summits, including the most recent one held in Romania in April 2008, have made strengthening ties with out-of-area nations a significant aspect of its agenda. How the Atlantic Alliance expands and which nations it includes have been a subject of much debate and several ideas about how to manage the spreading of NATO's influence.

One such idea is a further, global expansion of membership in what has hitherto been primarily a transatlantic alliance. It has come to be studied and discussed by a wide variety of commentators in the last two years. There has been support for the idea from foreign policy experts associated with both parties in America.

In an October 2007 speech to the NATO Supreme Allied Command Transformation Seminar, Republican Presidential Candidate Rudy Giuliani said that the membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be expanded to include non-European regional powers such as Israel, India, Japan, Australia, and Singapore.[1] In 2008, an election year, other U.S. politicians, such as Senator John McCain, expressed similar views about the future of America's alliances. Common themes include dissatisfaction with the United Nations and the possibility that a Global NATO would provide the United States with a more effective international collective security organization. International press magnate Rupert Murdoch gave voice to the outlook behind this support in a speech to the Atlantic Council of the United States in 2008:

> "We need to transform this Alliance [NATO] from a community formed around a map to a community based on common values and a willingness to take joint action in defense of these values. . . . Around the world, there is no shortage of nations who share our values, and are willing to defend them. I am thinking of countries like Australia, which sent troops to Iraq; Israel, which has been fighting Islamic terrorism almost since its founding; and Japan, which generally follows a more 'Western' policy than most of Western Europe."[2]

* Neil Bhatiya has been a Streit Council Research Fellow 2007-8 and is an MA candidate at The George Washington University.

[1] Rudolph Giuliani, "Mayor Giuliani's Remarks to the NATO Supreme Allied Command Transformation Seminar, Norfolk, VA, 10/11/07," JoinRudy2008 Homepage, ⟨http://www.joinrudy2008.com/article/pr/891⟩, accessed 11 December 2007.

[2] "Mr. Rupert Murdoch's Prepared Remarks for the Atlantic Council's 2008 Annual Awards Dinner," Atlantic Council Website, ⟨http://acus.org/about-news-Awards_2008 MurdochSpeech.asp⟩, accessed 17 June 2008.

These statements represent a conceptual challenge to the further development of NATO as well as to the continuation of Euro-American integration. Its expected impact on the potential member states bring up several points worth further investigation.

The Three Eras of NATO

NATO is once again faced with a turning point in its history. The first era in NATO's history was the Cold War, when the watchword of the Alliance was military preparedness in the face of Soviet bloc military power. NATO inherited a strong transatlantic bond, forged in the emergency of the Second World War, when military and political cooperation was unprecedented. The context of the Cold War codified the transatlantic connection in a new way. A long term ideological threat necessitated a permanent peacetime security structure. When there were problems within the Alliance, such as Charles De Gaulle's withdrawal of France from the military command in the 1960s, or tensions between member-states Turkey and Greece, the common threat could still focus minds.

The second era in NATO's history was the decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Absent a major geopolitical threat, the Alliance for the first time had to redefine itself. During the 1990s, NATO did so by being the vehicle by which the former Warsaw Pact became part of the larger European community. It also intervened in the Balkans—five operations in total from 1993 to 2001—proving that it could keep the peace in Europe. By the turn of the twenty-first century, the Alliance had overseen the transformation of post-World War II Europe from a fractured continent into a united one.

The terrorist attacks of 2001 ushered in the third of NATO's historical eras. In the immediate hours after the attack, NATO's member-states for the first time ever invoked Article 5 of its Treaty, acknowledging that the terror attacks represented an assault not only on the United States but on all of NATO. The Alliance's contribution to the War on Terror became quite tangible in 2003, when it took command of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. By extending its operations to places not only "out of area" but out of Europe, NATO took an historic step in its security mission.

It is in analyzing NATO's future that much of the discussion about a Global NATO has arisen. An academic debate about the globalization of NATO was galvanized by the publication in *Foreign Affairs* of an article by Robert Kagan and Ivo Daalder, entitled "Global NATO." It was perhaps the most strident call for NATO to embrace global partners. The authors' vision was bold: "NATO's next move is to open its membership to any democratic state in the world that is willing and able to contribute to the fulfillment of NATO's new responsibilities."[3] The article buttressed the arguments made by public officials such as the late Congressman Tom Lantos, or former Spanish Prime Minister José Maria Aznar. They reflected a general trend to expand inter-democracy cooperation, an impulse that has run strongly for the past 60 years.

The Complicating Factors

The idea for a Global NATO, however, is not without controversy. There exists an extensive literature on the pitfalls of extending the Alliance past its current geographic

[3] Robert Kagan and Ivo Daalder, "Global NATO," *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2006), 106.

boundaries. Some, such as Simon Koschut of the German Council on Foreign Relations is wary of the ability of NATO to institutionally adapt to global members, and holds that its priority should be on the relationship between the United States and Europe.[4] Many policymakers, particularly in Europe, have balked at the idea. French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who has recently expressed his desire for France to return to NATO's military command structure, has stated that one of his conditions is that the Alliance re-focuses on European security issues.[5]

Five nations in particular have been mentioned as potential member states in a Global NATO: Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and India. These nations are strong ones with a history of democratic governance and, save India, a close security relationship with the United States. Yet, proponents of a Global NATO should be cautious in considering how each of these nations would fit into an expanded security framework.

Japan

Excitement over Japan's possible role in a Global NATO coincided with its larger profile in international security, including the deployment, even if it proved temporary, of support troops to Afghanistan and Iraq, and, more enduringly, of peacekeepers to the Golan Heights, Cambodia, East Timor, Mozambique, and Zaire. These operations stood in direct contrast to Japanese defense posture during the Cold War and the decade after, when the Japanese constitution proscribed the deployment of troops outside of Japan. When this posture changed, the possibilities for Japan's global role increased.[6]

During its postwar history, Japan has relied on the United States as the guarantor of its international security. At first, this the result of the U.S. occupation, but later continued due to fears of Russian and Chinese Communist expansionism in East Asia. After the Cold War, Japan and the U.S. reaffirmed their relationship in broadened form, through the January 1992 Tokyo Declaration on the U.S.-Japan Global Partnership. The text of the Declaration specifically mentions Japanese cooperation with NATO: "Intensify trialogue among Japan, the U.S., and Europe, including political consultations among the G7 countries and political dialogue between Japan and NATO."[7]

The possibility of joining a multilateral alliance excites many Japanese who see the current bilateral relationship as constrictive. Memories of the Second World War still keep Japan highly controversial among other countries in the region; multilateral integration would rehabilitate it more fully and confer legitimacy on its foreign operations.

[4] Simon Koschut, "Global NATO or Global Partnerships?" *Kolner Forum fur Internationale Beziehugen und Sicherheitspolitik*, April 2006, ⟨http://www.dgap.org/midcomserveattachmentguid-4b8518f486af11db8b0e81a58ce940a140a1/KFIBS2006.04_koschut_globalzyxfouronexyznato_analysis_englishzyxfouronexyzedition_final.pdf⟩, 16.

[5] Honor Mahony, "Sarkozy Sets Conditions for Rejoining NATO Military Command," *EUObserver.com*, 25 September 2007 ⟨http://euobserver.com/9/24827/?rk=1⟩.

[6] Masashi Nishihara, "Can Japan be a Global Partner for NATO?" in Ronald D. Asmus, editor, *NATO and Global Partners: Views from the Outside*, (Riga Papers, 2006), ⟨http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/A4_Asmus-Editor_d.pdf⟩, 35-36.

[7] 1992 U.S.-Japan Global Partnership Agreement, *United States Department of Commerce International Trade Administration Market Access and Compliance Homepage* ⟨http://www.mac.doc.gov/japan/market-opening/ta920109.htm⟩, accessed 1 January 2008.

It has done this for Germany in Europe, which, despite a clearer and greater burden of guilt, has arguably developed a more solid international role and a healthier identity since 1949 than Japan. The prestige of becoming a responsible member of a multilateral community is important to continuing to develop an international role for Japan, and will be an essential requirement for domestic support within that nation.

Nevertheless, for many commentators Japan is still constrained by its interpretation of its constitution, which would, in a hypothetical future situation, prevent it from fighting side-by-side with its NATO allies. After all, the central precept of the NATO alliance is the concept of collective self-defense, something which the Japanese believe their constitution, in its current form, prohibits. This prohibition has been crystallized in debate over Japan's anti-terror role in Afghanistan. The Japanese Navy had been refueling U.S. warships in the Persian Gulf which had been supporting U.S. forces in Afghanistan, but in October 2007 support for the refueling operation collapsed in the Diet the Japanese Parliament.[8] Such opposition helped cause the fall of Fukuda's predecessor, Shinzo Abe. Supporters of Japan's role in a Global NATO need to take into account the ever-present opposition to Japan's military role expanding overseas.

There are also geo-strategic reasons for Japan's caution. It cannot predict how its two largest regional competitors, China and Russia, would react to its explicitly aligning itself with NATO.[9] Though the high tensions of the Cold War are gone, Northeast Asia still has the potential to be de-stabilizing. Russia has already expressed concern about the march of NATO eastward to its borders; such concern would only be heightened if the alliance was extended to encircle it on its eastern frontiers as well. Japan should be worried against provoking the deepening of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a group that includes Russia, China, and several former Soviet Republics, and brings in as observers the regional powers Iran, India, and Pakistan. Japan's self-interest gives it significant reasons for a cautious approach.

In the final analysis, whatever role Japan chooses for itself in a global NATO will depend on the domestic political willingness of the Japanese people to align themselves with a multilateral military alliance. Such a shift could flow from the Japanese seeing their bilateral relationship with the United States as no longer sufficient for their security needs, or from their seeing an opportunity for a more dignified role and for deeper reconciliation with some of their neighbors in a multilateral context.

Australia and New Zealand

Australia and New Zealand are the two rare Pacific nations that, like the U.S., have shared roots in British and European history. They have been allied with the United States since the beginning of World War II, and indirectly through Britain for decades longer. The relationship was solidified with the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) Treaty in 1951. Since then, relations among the three nations have been a cornerstone of Southeast Asian security. This close relationship is a reason why the proposal for including them in NATO faces relatively little objection in America. It is also, paradoxically, a reason cited for saying the prospects for either of them joining NATO are slim. Both countries feel secure in the current state of their bilateral relations with the United States.

[8] "Japanese PM rules out reshuffle," *BBC News International Version Website*, 4 January 2008, ⟨http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7171002.stm⟩, accessed 4 January 2008.
[9] Nishihara, 40.

Both nations possess a foreign policy vision which is significantly more integrated with their regional role in Southeast Asia rather than the global role envisioned by an expanded NATO. The People's Republic of China, specifically, is seen as a tense strategic relationship that needs to be managed on a bilateral basis, rather than through a new multilateral one. Neither Australia nor New Zealand would want such a relationship to be jeopardized by a headstrong rush to join a Global NATO. Rightly or wrongly, their leaders are reticent to see a multilateral alliance as a force-multiplier in conducting their relationship with China. Such a calculus of power might change, however, if it becomes apparent that the political and economic as well as military weight of the West is needed as a visible presence in the Pacific Rim.

In Australia the willingness to join a Global NATO faces domestic constraints that reflect a lack of elite and public enthusiasm. This has been particularly true since John Howard's electoral defeat in elections in November 2007. Howard, seen as too close of an ally to U.S. President George W. Bush, lost to Kevin Rudd, a former diplomat. Australia's participation in Iraq was highly unpopular among Australians. In attempting to move past it, Rudd seems to be attempting to fashion a foreign policy that gives Australians more independence within its relationship with the United States. While proponents of a Global NATO might argue that a multilateral forum could allow Australia to assert itself outside a bilateral relationship with the U.S., one writer on the subject concludes that "a formal alliance of Western nations on a global scale ("global NATO") is an idea whose time is yet to come, a least for Australians."[10]

South Korea

Alongside Japan, South Korea has been a keystone of the United States' relationship with East Asia. U.S. troops helped liberate the country from Japanese occupation at the end of the Second World War, giving support to the government of Synghman Rhee. When South Korea was invaded by North Korea, the United States led a United Nations effort to repel it. Since the armistice of 1953, U.S. troops have been continuously stationed along the tense 38th parallel. The United States also became involved in modernizing South Korea, which allowed the nation to become one of Asia's most dynamic economies. The inclusion of South Korea into a Global NATO framework has been buoyed by the recent election of Lee Myung-bak to the Presidency. He is seen as more pro-American than his predecessor. The cornerstone of his foreign policy is the "MB doctrine" which calls for a more solid Korea-U.S. alliance.[11]

Yet the same questions arise for South Korea as they do for Japan. With so much of Lee's focus on a stronger bilateral relationship between the United States and South Korea, where does a multilateral, NATO-like framework fit? Again, as in the case of Japan, the cloak of legitimacy, which a bilateral relationship with a superpower cannot provide, seems to give credence to the extension of NATO. The South Koreans have always been uneasy with their junior status vis-à-vis the United States in defense and

[10] Jeffrey Gray, "Future Directions for NATO: An Australian Perspective," in Ronald D. Asmus, editor, *NATO and Global Partners: Views from the Outside*, (Riga Papers, 2006), ⟨http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/A4_Asmus-Editor_d.pdf⟩, 33.

[11] Jin Dae-woong, "Veteran Diplomats, Academics formulate the MB Doctrine," *Korea Herald*, 21 December 2007, ⟨http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/NEWKHSITE/data/html_dir/2007/12/21/200712210050.asp⟩.

foreign policy matters. The question remains whether the important factor of a popular commitment to multilateralism exists in sufficient strength to justify Global NATO membership.

The second part of the "MB doctrine" is a delicate plan of re-engagement with North Korea. South Korea is keen on convincing the North to abandon its nuclear weapons program in exchange for investment into the country. The effort is broadly popular, but many in his own conservative Grand National Party may challenge his efforts if they give away too much to the government of Kim Jong-Il.[12] South Korea must also, like Japan, be wary of the response from Russia and China if it were to expand its commitments to a Global NATO.

India

Both the unique civilizational status of India and the complexities of its geographical and strategic position are limiting factors for its membership in an expanded NATO. If India were to join NATO, it would be the only country to do so which stands not only outside of the European-rooted countries of the West but outside of the sociological space of the OECD or First World, despite its historical colonial ties to Great Britain, as well as its continued political and linguistic connections. This could introduce new difficulties into NATO itself, as well as awkwardness for India.

India's status as a leader in the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War speaks to a fiercely independent spirit in foreign policy. India does not wish to identify its foreign policy primarily with the West, which membership in a Global NATO would notionally entail. The Asian OECD members, Japan and South Korea, are more plausible self-identifiers with the West. Since India cannot consider itself Western in this era, it is unlikely to be enthusiastic about the idea of Western leadership in the world, as embodied in NATO.

India also wishes to maintain good relations with Iran, Russia, and the People's Republic of China. India's foreign minister, Pranab Mukherjee, for example, has spoken out against a containment policy towards Iran, stating that "there's enough space to grow together to accommodate each other's legitimate aspirations."[13] This diverges from the stated position of both the United States and several states in the European Union, who wish to see stringent action taken against Iran's nuclear program. India, it would seem, does not see the same urgency as the West.

Nor does India share the dissatisfaction of some with the United Nations; indeed, it seeks a seat on the UN Security Council, rather than repudiating that organization as outmoded. This is not to say that the idea for a Global NATO implies a rejection of the United Nations. Rather, it is important to note that India's priorities are for expanding its role in the United Nations. India's focus on economic, as opposed to security, ties, speaks to its desire to be integrated into a global economic, rather than security, framework. Where it has sought an upgrading of military links is bilaterally, with the United States, on condition of de facto acceptance of India's nuclear status.

[12] Lee Byong-chul, "On the Lee Myung-bak Doctrine." *Ohmynews.com*, 29 August 2007, ⟨http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?at_code=430971⟩.

[13] Pranab Mukherjee, interview by Charlie Rose, 2 October 2007, New York, *Ministry of External Affairs, India Website*, ⟨http://mea.gov.in/⟩, accessed 4 December 2007.

India's domestic situation also seems to argue against it joining a bloc dominated by Western nations, especially the United States. The Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M), central among the leftist parties, has derailed ratification of a nuclear deal between India and the United States because it gives the U.S. too much latitude in interpreting when India has overstepped its bounds in developing its nuclear program.[14] This criticism comes despite the fact that the nuclear deal allows India, which is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), access to significant nuclear know-how.

As India seeks to be a global player, then, it will want to do it in its own way. It will continue to seek engagement with Western nations, but it will most likely do it in an informal manner, not in a formal military structure such as a Global NATO. India will also continue to seek to engage with nations bilaterally, outside of an overarching multilateral framework.

Conclusion

It would seem, then, from these brief overviews of the immediate obstacles, that "Global NATO" is a non-starter. However, this would underestimate the attraction of a gradual but still targeted move towards multilateralism in Asia. The argument may not be, as it seems at first glance, a question of the ultimate goal, but the path each of these nations take.

Daalder and Kagan argue in a generic way that the problems mentioned are not fatal to a Global NATO, because NATO's core values—democracy and common security—are attractive enough to both entice any of these nations and overcome the concerns of existing member-states. The question remains, however, whether or not the current and potential members of the Alliance feel an overwhelming sense that international security necessitates such an expansion. Most analysts do not believe that this is the case, absent an abrupt turn by China into further militarization and aggression in its foreign policies. This ever-present contingency could provide enough forward momentum for a Global NATO end-goal to become a part of each nation's foreign policy vision.

These points suggest that caution is needed when one discusses a Global NATO. Bilateral relations between the United States and these nations are often complex enough, without injecting into it a debate over an expansive security framework.

An immediate expansion is not the only option for the future. It would be a mistake to fail to continue pushing toward deeper relations among all of these nations. The discussions of a Global NATO represent a positive sign that the underlying desire to bind together nations with common political and social values is strong. While overall strategies may differ, most parties seem to agree on the necessity of better-organized cooperation. Doing so in a systematic but informal way would further reinforce the complex web of bilateral ties that have proliferated in these regions (South and East Asia), while not constricting the independent foreign policies of Japan, Australia, New Zealand, or India. These nations may not become full-fledged members of a Global NATO in the short term, but the United States and Europe have a lot to gain from inducting them into a global framework based on shared values.

[14] See commentary on the website of the Communist Party of India-Marxist ⟨http://www.cpim.org/⟩, accessed 10 December 2007.

NATO's statement from in the Bucharest summit in April 2008 embodies this approach: "[W]e reiterate our willingness to further develop existing, and openness to new, individual relationships, subject to the approval of the North Atlantic Council, and at a pace that respects mutual interests in so doing."[15] In spelling out a method to "respect mutual interests" by paying attention to "individual relationships," NATO can bring together its partners, without putting up front the problems raised by full-fledged NATO membership. By proceeding in this way, the United States and the NATO countries can expand their engagements in Asia and the Pacific with nations that it feels it has common political, economic, and social beliefs.

The Pacific basin democracies favor closer cooperation with NATO, even if on a piecemeal basis for now. There are various stages of partnership and of informal and formal relationships with NATO that can be traversed before facing the question of full membership; and after the intermediate stages have been traversed, the final step of membership can have an air of inevitability. This was the approach suggested a quarter century ago, in a paper for the Committees for a Community of Democracies by James V. Martin, a retired East Asian expert of the State Department. Our review of the obstacles that have been encountered in each of the prospective new member countries suggests that this is still the most likely approach.

In Eastern Europe the sense of exhilaration about rejoining the Western world after the liberation from Communism enabled unified national elites to win over initially skeptical populations, and overcome the inertia of numerous obstacles and objections to such a major step as NATO membership. Among the Asia-Pacific democracies there is no such exhilaration, just a decades-old entrenched reality of bilateral security arrangements with the U.S., quiet security cooperation with NATO, and membership on the economic level in the all-Western arrangements. The obstacles remain unmoved by any grand elite enthusiasm. The gradual path into NATO seems the most likely one.

[15] NATO Press Release, "Bucharest Summit Declaration," 3 April 2008 http://www.nato.int/docu/pr?2008/p08-049e.html, accessed 20 May 2008

How can a Union of the West be formed?

By Ira Straus*

Balladur argues in his book that a Union of the West is a matter of some urgency and the highest priority: the future of Europe and of America depends on it, so does the stability of the world, and historical changes are compressing the time available. Rather than evaluate his reasons for saying this, I will simply state that I think he is right. The question I will address here is: Can his goal be realized in a timeframe that answers to its urgency, and if so, how?

The problem: contradictory timeframes

Balladur himself believes that it will take a generation to do it, and that little more can be done in the near future than create a U.S.-EU Council to institutionalize U.S.-EU foreign policy consultations and further improve on the existing economic cooperation. This leaves it for a distant future to get to the point where Americans and Europeans could say they are together in a union.

This conclusion is at first sight eminently realistic, given the lack of an internal Will to form a Union. Yet this schedule—the internal schedule, so to speak—falls far behind the schedule demanded by the external realities Balladur identifies. The two timetables are incompatible.

The problem transformed: can Union be accelerated by incorporating existing structures?

Can the contradiction be resolved, by amending Balladur's pathway to Union?

This was, directly or indirectly, the subject of Balladur's meetings in Washington. His interlocutors brought home repeatedly the need to incorporate, as a cornerstone for building the Union, the "acquis Atlantique"—the accumulated heritage of institutions, policies and norms developed over many decades for Atlantic unity and integration. It was a point that he for the most part accepted in principle. But incorporating this acquis immediately affects the pace: it means the Union would not start from scratch. The glass would already be half full in military unity and economic unity, thanks to NATO and OECD. The timeline to Union would be shortened.

If all the existing Atlantic institutions were bundled together into a whole, along with all their decades of acquis, all their current trends of development, and all their new steps presently underway—and augmented further by the near-term steps proposed by Balladur—would this suffice for proclaiming a Union?

In my view it would suffice, albeit tenuously. Such a Union would be far from complete; it completion could still take a generation as Balladur wrote. Nevertheless it would be substantial enough to justify the word "union" and sustain conviction in it. To see this, it is worth taking a glance at all the elements that would be added together:

* Ira Straus was executive director in the 1980s of the Association to Unite the Democracies, the precursor organization of the Streit Council. His recent work has been on the widening and deepening of the EU and NATO. He is co-translator of Balladur's book, which will appear in English shortly.

1. NATO. It has a governing Council in nearly continuous session, which consults on all major foreign policy issues. When it issues common statements, as it does frequently, it does so in the name of an alliance with a common arm, giving it some substance as a common foreign policy.
2. The "Global NATO" processes: expansion of NATO's missions around the world, growth of NATO partnerships worldwide, growth of UN-NATO cooperation, expansion of NATO membership. Compared to the past, this is dramatically expanding the range of the common foreign policies of the allies.
3. NATO's Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) and Integrated Military Command structure. These quietly give NATO the most important form of supra-nationality of any international institution in the world: they internationalize the military, impinging on national sovereignty in this sensitive core area. This is something that was not achieved easily. It took the pressures of two world wars to bring the Atlantic allies to establish a SACEUR, as an emergency form of military union needed for saving Western freedom from total destruction at the hands of Nazism. The experience proved positive and, in face of a longer term Soviet threat, it was institutionalized in enduring form. It has asymmetries that are the healed scar tissue of its real world origins: the German military is subordinate to it to a unique degree. Germany's neighbors have been able for half a century to sleep at night without fear of what the German military might be planning against them, because its plans are made through NATO. It has been the concrete cornerstone of the democratic peace in Europe; it is what has made the EU possible. It is an acquis of inestimable importance.
4. Current proposals and trends in NATO that are accepted in the Balladur book: further expansion of NATO's global tasks; an updated globalized strategic concept; rules for operation of circles within NATO, so the circles can proceed to action without needing consensus among all the allies. The last of these would deepen the common foreign policy, by allowing NATO flexibility to respond to a far greater number of situations; it could turn NATO itself into a security and foreign policy Union.
5. The economic harmonization achieved over half a century through OECD. The U.S.-EU Transatlantic Economic Council, formed in 2007 to carry out a Transatlantic Single Market program, builds on this.
6. The cooperation achieved by a host of less well known trans-Atlantic institutions and arrangements—energy (IEA), inter-parliamentary (NPA), export control clubs for dangerous technologies and materials, G-7 and G-8 summits, and many others.
7. The U.S.-EU summits and their Transatlantic Agenda. Balladur's proposal for upgrading them into an Executive Council. Balladur's action proposals for it: currency coordination, common market, customs union.

These seemingly disparate elements have always formed an "Atlantic system"[1] or international "regime". They have however lacked much of a joint public

[1] James R. Huntley demonstrated this in *Uniting the Democracies: Institutions of the Emerging Atlantic-Pacific System* (New York University Press, 1980).

identity. Combining them and proclaiming them a Union would supply that crucial missing link.

The residual problem: opposing sensibilities on Atlantic institutions

There remains one obstacle to taking this approach. As Balladur shows in his book, the existing Atlantic unity is unbalanced and fragile psychologically. As long as America is dealing as Leader with a couple dozen small European countries as Followers, America will continue playing Leader games of exaggerated bluster and self-confidence, and Europeans will continue playing Follower games: falling begrudgingly into line, hedging all the way, and cultivating public opposition.

This is why he is loathe to build an Atlantic Union on the basis of the existing institutional acquis of NATO and OECD: their functioning depends too heavily on American leadership.

Balladur accepted the point that the Atlantic acquis must be incorporated into the Union, and specifically that NATO must be included. Yet he maintained his underlying French sensibility against using NATO as a foundation for the Union: he wants the Union based on a new departure, a bilateral U.S.-EU Council, where Europe and America talk one to one as equals.

This left unanswered the question of how in fact the existing Atlantic institutions could be incorporated into a Union if the structural cornerstone of the Union were a U.S.-EU consultative Council. It is not easy to see how this could be done, unless in a form that subordinates their tested, workable decision-making Councils to an untested U.S.-EU one where obstruction would be easier. If no good way can be found to incorporate them, one risks cashiering the present structures, with their large degree of union already quietly achieved, for the sake of a weaker structure bearing the imagery of Union. This is what the British have long accused the French of wanting to do: to undermine the real existing Atlantic quasi-union for the sake of a facade of U.S.-EU unity.

The problem is thus transformed, in this its third and final iteration, into a question of whether a viable compromise can be achieved between the two sensibilities: the French sensibility (shared by much of the EU) that a Union must have a structure and imagery of U.S.-EU equality, and the American sensibility (which is also the sensibility of many Europeans) that the existing Atlantic institutions and acquis must be incorporated into a Union without any loss in the process.

Can a Union in fact be formed that includes a new U.S.-EU Council, yet incorporates fully and undiminished the old Atlantic structures? Can these various institutions be combined structurally into a coherent whole, and bound together into a common identity under the name "Union"?

The solution: a West of integrated circles

We will suggest here a way in which this can be done. The key to our answer lies in incorporating into the Union of the West the method of "circles" which Balladur upholds on the European level.

Balladur devotes the longest chapter of his book to explaining the extent to which the EU in reality works through multiple circles, and to advocating that the EU be reformed to operate even more this way. What is missing is to apply this method to the wider level: the Union of the West.

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The Council of the Union of the West, on this model, would not be the new U.S.-EU Council alone as was initially proposed by Balladur. Rather it would encompass all the existing transatlantic councils equally alongside it: the NATO Council, the OECD Council, and the councils and summits of the other transatlantic bodies. The several Councils would be mutually associated as different formats of the Council of the Union of the West.[2] In each format the council would continue to act on the basis of its prior legal authority and through its established institutional structures. This is how the feat is managed of combining the institutions and gaining a stronger combined identity while losing nothing. NATO might end up as the defense ministry of the Union, OECD as an economic ministry.[3]

To avoid a self-defeating incoherence from the circle method, however, it is necessary to make use not only of the flexibility of circles but of the means pioneered in the EU for integrating them into a Whole. This is achieved in the EU through the shared overarching name and identity, and through structural links, such as a general Union council and a Union summit council that work in varying degrees with the councils in other formats.

We may call this the "Integrated Circles method", to underline both of its elements, flexibility and cohesion.

The flexibility of circles, known in Eurojargon as "variable geometry", is something that Balladur champions: he views himself as a pioneer of it, he wishes to see more of it on the European level, and he might well be pleased by the fact that it already exists also on the Atlantic level. It does not yet exist on the Atlantic level.

The integration of the circles into a cohesive whole is something that he takes for granted on the EU level; he does not write about it, but relies on it to give reassurances that further development of circles would be no threat to EU cohesion. At the same time, he is concerned to ensure that the general EU Council, with its inefficiencies, will not hamper the circles with their smaller and sometimes more efficient Councils. He seeks protection in both directions, for cohesion and for efficiency. Through Integrated Circles he finds an adequate measure of both protections.

Balladur does not apply either facet of Circles to the Atlantic level, their variable geometry or their integration into a Whole. Nevertheless it is a logical next step in his argument. It provides the formula for including NATO and the other circles of the Atlantic acquis together with his proposed U.S.-EU Council in a Union of the West, without the tensions and obstructions that would flow from an attempt at subordination of one to the other.

More important: the Integrated Circles method is probably the only one that would allow the Union of the West to be achieved realistically in a timeframe consistent with the necessities to which Balladur points. It enables this to be done by the device of adding up the existing powers along with any new elements of a fresh start, eliminating the need to demand an addition of unrealistically large new common powers at the moment of a Declaration of Union. It would very nearly resolve the contradiction that

[2] In EU language, when they meet separately they would be "the Council in NATO session", "the Council in OECD session", "the Council in U.S.-EU session", and so forth.

[3] Other institutional connections would tend to develop on this basis. Countries might begin appointing a single main representative to several of the Council formats, with specialized deputies for each format. Parliamentary assemblies would tend to become associated. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly has already doubled at times as the core of an OECD assembly; the practice would likely be regularized as the Union Assembly, and there might eventually be a directly elected chamber of the Assembly, as this befits a Union.

seemed so hopelessly irreconcilable at the start of this article: the contradiction between the realism of how much is necessary in the way of Union of the West and the realism of how little people are as yet willing to do.

The painful necessity of realism about inequalities

Is this compromise of sensibilities sufficient to be accepted on both sides? It requires a maturity in dealing with things as they are, including inequalities. Inequality exists in the objective realities, no matter whether Europe is taken as individual states or as the EU; it cannot be overcome by demanding to be treated as an equal.

In a West united in Integrated Circles, the U.S.-EU Council would be fully present; it would have open institutional space for building as much as it can on a basis of U.S.-EU one to one relations and on image of equality—as much as the capacities of the EU will bear; but it would not detract from the work of the NATO and OECD Councils or from the integration they have built and continue to build on a basis of the existent realities.

One runs up here against the propensity of some Europeans—even occasionally Balladur—to blame the existing Atlantic institutions for the inequality in relations between Europe and America. It is a mistake, or perhaps an optical illusion: The Atlantic institutions increase the visibility of the inequality, but they are not the cause of it. In practice they reduce the inequality and restrain the shocks it would otherwise impose on the weaker parties.[4] From 1900 to 1939, before the Atlantic institutions existed, Europe suffered from its inferiority before American power in a far more severe manner than it has suffered from the same inequality since the institutions began forming in 1947: in the earlier period it suffered a breakdown in two world wars, thanks in no small part to America's policy of standing aside with its power in peacetime and entering into real commitments only after the continent had sunk into total war. That was, on the surface, a policy of non-hegemony and respect for European equality; but that benign view of it was yet another optical illusion. Wise Europeans have learned to see the reality and ignore the optical illusions.

The Atlantic institutions have provided them an incubator for beginning to unite Europe, one of the two paths for eventually overcoming the inequality. The other path is by strengthening the common Atlantic institutions themselves: they serve to reduce the impact of the underlying inequality on Europeans, give Europeans a consultative say in the policies that affect them, and allow the beginnings of common direction of common policy. At a distant ideal endpoint of perfected Union, they would provide full equality in the direction of all relevant policies; just as, at an even more distant ideal

[4] This illusion about the origins of intra-Atlantic inequality is a specific case of a more general optical illusion about the "democratic deficit": The democratic deficit in foreign policy is at its most severe at the baseline of international relations among separate states, but is usually taken for granted on this level since it is hard to imagine anything being done about it. When international institutions are formed, the deficit is reduced, yet becomes more visible; it persists inside the institutions in a form that is new, and is easier to attack since the institutions are fragile and can easily be blown apart. Nevertheless, it is the further deepening of international institutions that is the only cure for the deficit. For a theoretical schema on the institutionalization and overcoming of democratic deficits and international inequities see Ira Straus, *Supranational Norms in International Affairs* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, 1992), chapter 7.

endpoint, a perfected European Union would achieve a full separate equality vis-à-vis America. One can understand an urge to assert a separate and equal dignity against America, by completing the second line of equalization before doing anything along the first line. But if the goal is not psychological but the practical one of such equality as can be achieved, then the first line must also be pursued in the here and now.

It is a matter of maturity, for the absence of which Balladur often flays his fellow Europeans, to do what can be done under the conditions of the inequality that exists. These conditions are likely to persist for a long time to come; even if all of Balladur's proposed reforms for the EU were adopted, it would be generations before the EU achieved true equality with the U.S.; and unfortunately it is possible, as Stanley Sloan points out, that none of them will be adopted. One cannot make historically urgent matters wait on an equality that is a long way off at best. One has to make the best of the situation. Europeans, with their long traditions of diplomacy in a system of independent and radically unequal states, should understand this more readily than Americans, with their shorter experience and larger penchant to rhetorical idealism.

America has for the most part accorded the EU as much role and attention as it can bear, given its limited capabilities. The shortfalls it has shown from time to time in this regard are secondary; more often it has favored the EU with exaggerated attentions, in the hope of helping it along. There are ways America can still do more to support the EU, but Balladur has a point when he criticizes Europeans for using America as a scapegoat for their own failures in uniting and taking responsibility for themselves.

Balladur has floated an important compromise between European and American sensibilities on one specific set of circles: the circles within NATO. It was back in the 1990s that NATO adopted a policy of circles, called CJTFs or "coalitions of the willing". In more than a decade, it has barely implemented it; the EU always wants to be the main coalition, while the U.S. wants its own coalitions. Balladur supplies the formula needed for overcoming this stand-off: it is, for NATO to develop rules for proceeding without unanimity. This would open up space for the circles desired by both parties to go forward. Should this wait on prior EU military strengthening? It would make more sense to proceed the other way around: adoption of this reform on the NATO level would in itself be advantageous to both sides, and would serve as an incentive for the EU to strengthen itself to make fuller use of the opening.

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The inevitability of the Integrated Circles approach for a Union of the West

The idea of a Union of the West in multiple circles is not entirely new. If, as we have suggested, it is the only way for Union is to become a reality in a relevant timeframe, then it is all but inevitable that persons who are looking for a realistic pathway to Union will arrive at one or another form of it.

This has in fact happened in past experience, with the Committees for a Community of Democracies (CCD), an offshoot of Streit's Atlantic Union movement, consisting largely of former diplomats and high level personalities in Washington and London. CCD in its early years, 1978-83, was seeking to find a way to bind the West together into a Community with a level of integration and self-awareness comparable to the EC. It initially did this by looking for such new collective programs and structures for the Atlantic and OECD countries as were immediately needed in that period; but, with its close personal ties to the diplomatic world, it quickly found what Balladur observes today: that there is not sufficient will around for forming new structures with strong new

powers. CCD concluded that the main thing to do was to put together the substantial Atlantic and Atlantic-Pacific institutions that already existed, giving them a common umbrella structure and common identity; with that done, there would already be a proto-Community, and, invigorated by the common identity, it could develop the will to proceed farther. CCD's founder, James Huntley, encapsulated this doctrine in a book[5] that became the main restatement of Atlanticism for the later decades of the 20th century, building on Streit but adapting his goal to the realities of the partial integrative institutions that had been meanwhile developed in the Euro-Atlantic world and what could be learned from them. Huntley established the plural foundation of Union by pointing to the multiple existing institutions that would have to be joined in it. Robert Foulon, co-founder with Huntley of CCD, carried this thought a half step farther: that it should be categorized as a "plural Union", and should have multiple levels of country membership as well as multiple institutional substructures. This left open the question of what would hold all this pluralism together. Balladur, with his emphasis on the circles method as used in the EU, supplies, if only by analogy, the practical formula the Atlanticists have needed for joining their multiple institutions into a higher unity: structural links among the institutional circles, beginning with an association of their Councils, a common identity and legal existence as a Whole, and a strong identity name for the Whole, such as "European Union" or "Union of the West".

Interestingly, Huntley, again like Balladur, pinned much of his hopes on a summit or Executive Council. He admired the European Council for invigorating the EC, and hoped the G-7 would similarly reinvigorate the Atlantic institutions.[6] Some decades later, it is worth considering why this has not happened. The Summits have no formal relation to the Atlantic institutions; they cannot draw them together into a Community or Union. It works more readily the other way around: Once the several Atlantic institutions are bound together formally, e.g. by associating their Councils as a Council of a Union, the great power Summits within the Union—whether Huntley's G-7 or Balladur's G-2—will naturally take on an energizing role for the Union as a whole. If a G-7 or G-2 proved itself in practice more reliable and efficient than other councils in the work of the Union, it might later be given a formal title of Council of the Union with some supervisory authority over other councils.

Union as a positive Identity

A Whole with an Identity is more than the sum of its parts: an identity creates virtuous circles, reinforcing some of the elements that go into its making. And "Union" is a powerful identity. So is "West". It is a name that publics can identify with as a new layer of their political identity and belonging.

In its absence, the West has at best a weak self-awareness and little confidence in its own solidity. This is a source of the core paradox of today's world that Balladur identifies in his book: a continued objective material predominance of the West, coupled

[5] James R. Huntley, *Uniting the Democracies: Institutions of the Emerging Atlantic-Pacific System* (New York University Press, 1980).

[6] Huntley, *Uniting the Democracies*, pp. 293-4. John Ikenberry has also written on the G-7 as a potential motor for a Western Community. Professor Modelski, who was also an early member of CCD, has recently transposed this proposal from Huntley's G-7 to Balladur's G-2, proposing it be used as the energizing instrument for the wider Atlantic community, in "A Window of Opportunity for a Rebalanced Relationship," *Freedom & Union* Vol. III No. 1.

with a rapid subjective weakening of the West,[7] risking the destabilization of the world order in which the West continues to play an indispensable role. Balladur logically identifies Union as the solution.

A strong identity-name is something that the EU already has, and that the wider Western institutions taken separately have been lacking. Sensationalistic books on the decline of America put this difference to use: they treat the EU as an entity but the West as virtually non-existent. This brings them by definition—by false definition—to the conclusion that the EU is not to be counted together with America but apart from and against it.[8] It turns the EU's rise, by this sleight of hand, or sleight of definition, into a proof of America's decline, and encourages adversarial behaviors that really could tear apart the West.[9] A visible, solemnly declared Union of the West is the obvious way to put an end to the illusion of the West's non-existence.

Balladur's explicit goal of Union comes as a breath of fresh air. It blows away the stale air of the assumption that the Western countries must and will continue acting separately and against one another; it throws into the picture the thought that they could after all do the sensible thing, and ought to consider it. It has almost shock value to hear it coming from a French Gaullist source: this has led it to be received with near amazement by most commentators.[10]

In the two decades after 1945, Union of the West was a widely shared goal among Western governments and foreign offices; and it had been the goal of France ever since World War I. It was a goal that provided inspiration, and an almost physical image in the minds of leaders and elites of the direction they needed to be going. Thanks to the orientation provided by the goal, national leaders were able to take historic steps—the Marshall Plan, NATO, OECD—to build a long-term institutionalized unity on some of the most important matters. The goal and the orientation faded out of view in the period of Vietnam and De Gaulle. The integration of the West stalled at half-way point. The

[7] Balladur, *Pour une Union occidentale* . . . , p. 14.

[8] This can be seen in Parag Khanna's 2008 book, *The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order*.

[9] This can be seen in Khanna's precursor, Paul Kennedy, who performed the same sleights of hand, or of category, in *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*. Despite misleading categories and statistics, Kennedy succeeded in lending respectability to a movement of nationwide belief in America's decline in the late 1980s. The Western alliances were treated as a factor causing America's decline and draining its economy to the advantage of its European and Japanese competitors. The implicit—sometimes explicit—prescription of breaking with Europe and Japan, had it been acted upon, would have turned the anti-Western categories into a self-fulfilling prophecy. But it turned out differently: the West won the Cold War, the Japanese bubble burst, and the West held together, and America and the West, far from declining, held still greater preeminence than before.

[10] But not perhaps by *Freedom & Union* readers. De Gaulle had proposed an organic Union to Britain in 1940; documents on this can be found in *Freedom & Union*, July-August 1958, pp. 14-16. The editor, Clarence Streit, always interpreted De Gaulle's later anti-Atlanticism generously, as a reaction to Suez; he often cited communications from Gaullist leaders that it would be different if America were willing to discuss a genuine Union with Europeans. Streit was a longtime friend of Michel Debre, a close associate of De Gaulle and a Prime Minister under his Presidency. During the war, Debre and Emmanuel Monick had written *Demain la paix* (Plon, 1945); it took an Atlanticist view, and portions of it were later translated by Streit's wife Jeanne Defrance and printed in three issues of *Freedom & Union*, Oct., Nov. and Dec. 1959.

European Community came out of its era of stagnation in 1985, and in half a dozen years transformed itself from Community to Union. NATO came out of stagnation in 1991. The West is moving again, albeit sometimes slowly. The glass is still half full from all the progress previously achieved in moving toward Union; it puts the goal in striking range. The book is certainly timely.

From Book to Action

Balladur writes as a political actor, not an abstract theorist. His book is not a treatise engraved in stone but a proposal in motion, with all the contradictions that political motion entails. His consultations in Washington were intended to identify and think through the contradictions, and thereby move his proposals toward a form that could be shared and acted upon. He expressed throughout a confidence that ways would be found, through discussion and through pragmatic adaptations, to resolve the major issues that were raised.

Balladur's method of managing contradictions in political motion is one that has not been lacking in fruit in the past: he is credited, or blamed by his enemies, with having led most of the Gaullist movement back to a pro-EU stance and out of its anti-Americanism. In the process he has had to bridge contradictions far worse than those that remain in his present book. Will his method bear similar fruit this time?

His book has the virtue of facing the full range of challenges before the West; the virtue of proposing solutions that are politically realistic yet are intended to become commensurate with the challenges; and the virtue of expressing the author's will to develop the proposals in motion and see them through to realization. That last virtue may prove the greatest of all.